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Abstract

Current systems security practices lack an effective approach to prioritize and
tailor systems security efforts to develop and field secure systems in challenging
operational environments, which results in business and mission stakeholders becoming
more susceptible to an array of disruptive events. This work informs Systems Engineers
on recent developments in the field of system security engineering and provides a
framework for more fully understanding the application of Systems Security Engineering
(SSE) processes, activities, and tasks as described in the recently released National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-160. This SSE
framework uniquely offers a repeatable and tailorable methodology that allows system
developers to focus on high Return-on-Investment (RoI) SSE processes, activities, and
tasks to more efficiently meet stakeholder protection needs and deliver trustworthy secure
systems.
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A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING, PRIORITIZING, AND APPLYING
SYSTEMS SECURITY ENGINEERING PROCESSES, ACTIVITIES, AND TASKS
1. Introduction
1.1. Background
Over the past 50 years, Congress and the DoD have continually explored ways to
improve system acquisition outcomes, including improvements to sound management
practices, such as realistic cost estimating, prototyping, Systems Engineering (SE), and
systems security [3]. Typically, SE and Systems Security Engineering (SSE) are defined
and shaped by the context, environment, and situation in which they are embedded where
the classical SE/SSE approach is tailored to and works best in situations in which all
relevant factors are largely under the control of or can at least be well understood and
accommodated by the engineering organization and/or the program manager [4].
Generally speaking, this situation occurs when system and security requirements are
relatively well established (between the engineers and the stakeholders), technologies are
relatively mature, the system is being developed for a single or relatively homogeneous
user community, and at best a single individual has management and funding authority
over the program [4].
However, as the dynamicity of these systems present complexities that scale
beyond our ability to comprehend, manage, and control, we often find that systems
security is not adequately addressed in enterprises or supporting systems, resulting in
business and mission stakeholders becoming susceptible to a considerable array of
disruptive events [5], [4]. Consequently, special attention is needed to develop more
1

defensible and survivable systems for uncertain, unpredictable, and challenging
operational environments, to include attacks by intelligent and persistent adversaries.
Additionally, recent years have seen serious erosion in the ability of U.S. forces to
quickly field new weapons systems in response to changing threats, as well as a large
increase in the cost of these weapons systems [7]. For example, the military’s acquisition
cycle for major weapons systems currently take two to three times longer than 30 years
ago [7]. While many causes for this trend have been suggested, one common view is that
better SE and development planning could help shorten the time required for
development [7]. Another key cause of poor acquisition outcomes is the mismatch
between the validated capability requirements for a new weapon system and the
appropriate SE knowledge, funding, and time that is planned to develop that new system
[3]. The Department of Defense’s (DoD) three key decision making processes for
acquiring weapon systems (requirements determination, resource allocation, and the
acquisition management system) are fragmented, making it difficult for the department to
achieve a balanced mix of weapon systems that are achievable and affordable and often
begin with validated requirements that have not been informed by solid SE practices [3].
As modern systems continue to increase in size and complexity, security is not
adequately addressed, resulting in key stakeholders becoming susceptible to attacks from
intelligent adversaries and a considerable array of disruptive events [1]. Systems,
networks, and sensitive information can be compromised by malicious and inadvertent
activities despite best efforts to prevent such events from occurring [2]. These
vulnerabilities often result in business and mission losses when assets (i.e., people,
processes, and technology) are insufficiently protected; thus, allowing for system faults,
2

degradation, misuse, abuse, and security violations. Such losses can result in mission
failure and financial ruin, as well as, reduced trust from key stakeholders.
1.2. Specific Issue
In order to address this critical systems security gap and meet steadily increasing
security needs from the commercial sector, international partners, and the defense
industry in a sustainable manner, the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), the National Security Agency (NSA), and several other global industry leaders
began a collaborative effort to deliver a comprehensive systems-oriented approach to
SSE [8]. The ultimate objective of NIST SP 800-160 Systems Security Engineering is to
address security issues from a stakeholder requirements and protection needs perspective
and to use established engineering processes to ensure that such requirements and needs
are addressed early in and throughout the life cycle of the system [8]. More specifically,
NIST Special Publication 800-160 is aligned with the SE life cycle processes of
ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 and provides “considerations for a multidisciplinary approach in
the engineering of trustworthy secure systems” [8].
To maximize the utility of these SSE processes, activities and tasks, it is
important to understand that systems-level thinking is required in the bringing together of
expertise and perspectives from multiple disciplines, security specialties, and other
specialty engineering areas. Moreover, when considering an adversary who is agile,
intelligent, determined, and highly competent, a systematic way to identify, assess, and
plan for negative impacts, losses, and associated consequences is critical for the Systems
Engineer.

3

1.3. Research Objectives
As current security practices lack effective methodologies to prioritize and
address system security issues in complex systems, this research effort aims to identify
gaps in current security approaches and apply the NIST SP 800-160 in a rationalized and
streamlined process [9]. The research questions to be answered are three-fold:
1. How can SSE be understood and described with respect to established
Systems Engineering processes?
2. How can SSE efforts be decomposed into universally applicable systems
security domains?
3. How can SSE processes, activities, and tasks be prioritized and applied to
diverse classes of systems?
1.4. The Way Ahead
Given the progressive nature of the research questions, this thesis will follow a
scholarly, or k-paper, format. In Chapters 2 and 3, the publications “A Foundation for
Developing Sustainably Secure Systems” and “Putting the ‘Systems’ in Security
Engineering: An Examination of NIST Special Publication 800-160” provide Systems
Engineers and security professionals an update on recent developments in the field of
SSE to promote a systematic view of security which ensures networked systems operate
properly despite uncertain environments, malicious and non-malicious disruptions, and
intelligent adversaries. In addition, these articles offer a brief overview of the NIST SP
800-160, emphasizing a systematic, yet tailorable approach for system security in order to
familiarize Systems Engineers with the NIST SP 800-160 and provide a foundation for
developing sustainably secure systems [9]. In particular, this section explores how the
NIST SP 800-160 can help the Systems Engineer understand what they are getting from
4

SSE, and emphasizes that Systems Engineers may perform some of the multidisciplinary
SSE tasks in collaboration with other engineering team members [9]. In doing so,
Chapters 2 and 3 describe current SSE practices with respect to established SE processes
as presented in the NIST SP 800-160.
Chapter 4, “System-Agnostic Security Domains for Understanding and
Prioritizing Systems Security Engineering Efforts,” puts further focus on the SSE
approach. More specifically, this article provides a comprehensive discussion of SSE
concepts, methodologies, and frameworks, in addition to introducing several competing
systems security concepts and outlining their respective security domains, noting that the
preponderance of existing frameworks are intended for Information Technology (IT) and
cybersecurity applications [4]. This article uniquely analyzes the constituent parts of the
systems security problem through an SSE perspective by defining seven system agnostic
security domains in order to better address the systems security problem holistically [4].
In doing so, this work represents essential knowledge for understanding how to more
effectively apply SSE processes for engineering trustworthy and secure systems. By
utilizing this concept with well-established SSE activities and tasks, this paper identifies
a means for analyzing the SSE approach and understanding where to focus limited
resources to maximize the stakeholders’ return on investment [4].
In Chapter 5, “A Framework for Prioritizing Systems Security Engineering
Processes, Activities, and Tasks,” this research looks to incorporate the assessment
methods presented in Chapter 4 alongside NIST SP 800-160 to investigate its tailorable
nature and explore how to efficiently apply the NIST SP 800-160 to various classes of
systems [10]. This work aligns with the goals of the NIST SP 800-160 by examining the
5

tailorable set of SSE activities and tasks to support critical missions and business
operations [8]. By examining the NIST SP 800-160’s SSE activities and tasks in relation
to the agnostic security domains of chapter 4, this work describes possible prioritization
schemes for streamlining demanding security approaches, increasing the manageability of
SSE efforts, and lowering implementation costs. Finally, conclusions and future work are
presented in Chapter 6.

6
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2. Introduction to SSE Concepts and the NIST SP 800-160
2.1. Description
This chapter provides a brief introduction to SSE and is intended to familiarize
the reader, and in particular Systems Engineers, with the ongoing and recent
developments in the field of SSE. The article itself explores the history and vision of SSE
and how the NIST SP 800-160 Systems Security Engineering can help Systems Engineers
understand what they are getting from SSE, and emphasize that Systems Engineers may
perform some of the multidisciplinary SSE tasks in collaboration with other engineering
team members.
This article lays the initial groundwork for future research by introducing the
systems oriented view of SSE and its evolution over the past few decades. In addition, the
Authors provide an initial assessment of the draft NIST SP 800-160.
2.2. Publication Details
Title: A Foundation for Developing Sustainably Secure Systems
Publication: INCOSE INSIGHT, Volume 19/Issue 2
Date: July 2016
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3. Exploring NIST SP 800-160’s Tailorable Design
3.1. Description
This chapter complements the article of chapter 2 and continues to describe the
systems-oriented components of NIST SP 800-160. Unlike typical standards that define
elaborate prescriptive security methods, checklists, and directives, the NIST SP 800-160
uses tailorable Systems Engineering processes, activities, and tasks to address security
engineering considerations early and sustainably throughout the system’s life cycle. This
article details how to utilize the NIST SP 800-160, from familiarizing top level
management with SSE concepts to allowing practitioners to master the specialty domain
of SSE by building upon the expanded material provided in NIST SP 800-160.
In this article, the Authors also provide a general overview of the structure of the
NIST SP 800-160, elaborating on its tailorability for securing system designs, noting that
regardless of system type, size, or complexity, the NIST SP 800-160 offers a
customizable “development kit” for engineering trustworthy secure systems. The Authors
offer an overview of the NIST SP 800-160 and provide a detailed example of the NIST
SP 800-160’s tailorable design. Lastly, a research agenda into future efforts regarding the
application of established SSE processes, activities, and tasks for the development of
complex systems is mentioned.
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3.2. Publication Details
Title: Putting the “Systems” in Security Engineering: An Examination of NIST
Special Publication 800-160
Publication: IEEE Security & Privacy, Volume 14/Number 4
Date: July/August 2016
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Putting the “Systems” in
Security Engineering:

An Examination of NIST Special Publication 800-160
Logan O. Mailloux | Air Force Institute of Technology
Michael A. McEvilley | The MITRE Corporation
Stephen Khou and John M. Pecarina | Air Force Institute of Technology

M

odern systems are increasingly complex, with extensive infrastructure dependencies
and interactive system-of-systems
behaviors. As networked systems,
they’re inherently susceptible to a
wide range of malicious and nonmalicious events that can result in
unexpected disruptions and unpredictable emergent behaviors. In
addition, the dynamicity of these
systems present complexities that
scale beyond our ability to understand, manage, and protect against
all possible events. Therefore, special
attention is needed to develop more
defensible and survivable systems for

76

July/August 2016

operation in uncertain, unpredictable, and challenging environments,
to include attacks by intelligent and
persistent adversaries as well as
instances of abuse and misuse by the
intended system users.
To address this critical systems
security gap, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), National Security Agency
(NSA), and several other industry leaders around the world have
collaborated in a five-year effort to
provide a comprehensive systems-
focused description of systems security engineering (SSE). A recent
milestone in this effort was the May
Copublished by the IEEE Computer and Reliability Societies 

2016 announcement of the second public draft release of NIST
Special Publication (SP) 800-160
Systems Security Engineering:
Considerations for a Multidisciplinary Approach in the Engineering of Trustworthy Secure Systems.1
Unlike other NIST 800-series
special publications and other ITfocused security standards, NIST
SP 800-160 employs a systems engineering approach to address stakeholder protection needs, to satisfy
security requirements, and to demonstrate systems security trustworthiness.1 More specifically, NIST SP
800-160 provides a comprehensive
collection of foundational engineering considerations in the form of
SSE activities and tasks based on
well-established security principles,
concepts, and practices.
In this article, we provide a brief
history of SSE, describe the systemsoriented components of NIST SP
800-160, and outline future work
regarding the application of SSE
activities and tasks for the development of complex systems.

History of SSE

Figure 1 depicts a history of notable systems security works dating
back to the 1970s. Initially, the US
Department of Defense (DoD)
sponsored several security research
efforts focused on building and
assuring computing systems with
the correct level of protection.2,3
1540-7993/16/$33.00 © 2016 IEEE

Early computer
security–focused works

Department of Defense NIST SP 800-160
Military Standard 1785
“Revitalization of
on system security
“Systems Security
R. Anderson,
“Orange Book”
System Security”
engineering
Engineering”
Systems Engineering

...

...
1970

1983

1989

2000

2011

2016

Figure 1. A concise history of systems security engineering (SSE). This timeline captures the major publications that contributed to the
formalized need for and establishment of US National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication (NIST SP) 800-160.

These works culminated in the
“Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria,” otherwise known as
the revered “Orange Book.”4 (Note
that the “Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria” evolved into
the “Common Criteria” and continues to serve as an internationally
recognized methodology for evaluating IT products.5) Despite their
focus on computer security, these
early efforts recognized the foundational systems nature of their work:
“[P]roviding satisfactory security
controls in a computer system is in
itself a system design problem … a
combination of hardware, software,
communication, physical, personnel, and administrative-procedural
safeguards.”2 Thus, the specialty
domain of systems security was
informally born from the culmination of these efforts.
In 1989, the DoD formalized this
systems security concept in Military
Standard (MIL-STD) 1785, which
defined both the technical and
managerial aspects of SSE for the
first time.6 While MIL-STD 1785
emphasizes the systematic application of scientific rigor, it also reinforces that security must be treated
no differently from any other system
capability or quality characteristic:6
Systems Security Engineering (SSE). An element of system engineering that applies
www.computer.org/security

scientific and engineering principles to identify security vulnerabilities and minimize or contain
risks associated with these vulnerabilities. It uses mathematical, physical, and related
scientific disciplines as well as
the principles and methods of
engineering design and analysis
to specify, predict, and evaluate
the vulnerability of the system to
security threats.

During the IT bubble of the 1990s
and 2000s, these initial systems-
oriented security notions lapsed as
researchers concentrated almost
exclusively on network security and
information assurance. During these
years of rapid computing advancements, recognized security expert
Ross Anderson was one of only a
few who continued to build a holistic
view of systems security in his seminal work Security Engineering.7
In 2011, the DoD once again
acknowledged its need for an integrated, systems approach for developing secure systems.8 Accordingly,
the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Systems Engineering led the DoD’s revitalization
of SSE through the methodology
defined as Program Protection.9,10
Although this effort serves well to
bring system security concepts and
principles to protect critical program information, technologies,

and critical components (that is, the
realization of protections for corporate intellectual property and critical capability assets), the specialty
discipline of SSE as described in
MIL-STD 1785 was never fully realized.11 This left the security community without a systematic approach
to effectively build in security for
complex, unprecedented systems.

Why NIST SP 800-160?

To meet steadily increasing systems
security needs from the commercial
sector, international partners, and
the defense industry in a sustainable manner, NIST and NSA began
a collaborative effort to deliver a
systems-oriented approach to SSE
in order to “address security issues
from a stakeholder protection
needs and requirements perspective.”1 More concretely, NIST SP
800-160 ensures systems security
requirements are “addressed with
appropriate fidelity and rigor” by
aligning with the engineering viewpoint captured in the 30 systems
life-cycle processes of ISO/IEC/
IEEE 15288. 1,12
In contrast to typical standards
that define elaborate prescriptive
security methods, checklists, or
the like, NIST SP 800-160 uses
the tailorable systems engineering processes to address security
engineering considerations early
and sustainably throughout the
77
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system’s life cycle. Perhaps the best
way to understand “why NIST SP
800-160?” is through its fivefold
purpose:1
■■ to provide a basis to formalize a
discipline for SSE in terms of its
principles, concepts, and activities;
■■ to foster a common mindset to
deliver security for any system,
regardless of its scope, size, complexity, or stage of the system life
cycle;
■■ to provide considerations and
to demonstrate how SSE principles, concepts, and activities can
be effectively applied to systems
engineering processes;
■■ to advance the field of SSE by promulgating it as a discipline that
can be applied and studied; and
■■ to serve as a basis for the development of educational and training
programs, including the development of individual certifications
and other professional assessment criteria.
Consequently, NIST SP 800-160
provides a comprehensive description of SSE, which makes it arguably the most significant work in
the systems security field to date.13
Moreover, it’s useful to a wide audience of security-minded professionals from young security specialists
to seasoned program managers.

How to Use NIST
SP 800-160

Because of NIST SP 800-160’s fivefold purpose, its usage and reader
ship are quite broad. Moreover,
the publication (not a standard) is
written primarily as an SSE reference, organized across 30 system
life-cycle processes and not meant
to be read from top to bottom. For
example, managers required to
work with systems security engineers might simply read the seven
pages of chapter 1 to become more
familiar with SSE. Conversely,
those trying to master the specialty
78
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domain of SSE will benefit from
NIST SP 800-160’s detailed chapters and appendixes that clearly
explain foundational SSE concepts,
such as a systems perspective, active
and passive protection capabilities,
and security design principles.
In addition, NIST SP 800-160
is well suited to support specialized certifications and educational
programs such as the Information
Systems Security Engineering concentration of the Certified Information Systems Security Professional
or the graduate certificate offered
by the US Naval Postgraduate
School.14 This is particularly important for security-minded organizations concerned with systems
security training and education. For
example, the DoD is trying to educate a large workforce consisting of
hundreds of thousands of personnel
across the US Army, Navy, Marine
Corps, and Air Force.
Furthermore, there are several
practical reasons for those already
working in the systems security
space to read and review NIST SP
800-160. For example, chief security
officers will want to become familiar with it to determine how their
development life cycle will change,
system and software developers
might want to revise and refine their
existing engineering life cycles, and
security researchers (particularly
those studying security requirements) will want to become familiar
with new engineering recommendations. In addition, systems security researchers will want to closely
watch for lessons learned and application gaps in NIST SP 800-160
because these could very well lead
to new areas of research.

Building a Systems
Perspective

SSE is concerned with the development of a system’s security
capability and with the protection of sensitive data, information, processes, technologies, and

intellectual property throughout
the system’s entire life cycle. That is,
trustworthy systems must be conceptualized, designed, built, operated, sustained, and retired while
accounting for and attempting to
control asset losses and associated negative consequences. Thus,
as Anderson comments, “security
engineering is about building systems to remain dependable in the
face of malice, error, or mischief.”7
In this regard, SSE has two predominant roles in the larger systems
engineering effort:1
■■ engineering the security protection capability of the system, and
■■ advising on the security aspects of
the entire system.
Successful execution of these
two roles requires an SSE “presence”
throughout all ISO/IEC/IEEE
15288 system life-cycle processes.
In this way, NIST SP 800-160 provides a systematic methodology for
applying SSE principles, concepts,
and practices with an emphasis on
capturing security requirements and
associated verification measures,
engineering security capabilities,
and conducting verification and validation activities to provide evidentiary data to support assertions that
security claims have been met.

SSE Activities and Tasks

NIST SP 800-160 provides a systematic approach to meeting
stakeholders’ security needs and
objectives through the application
of SSE activities and tasks. As Figure 2 shows, NIST SP 800-160 is
organized in a three-chapter format with several detailed appendixes. Chapters 1 and 2 introduce
the specialty domain of SSE and
lay the necessary foundation for
executing the SSE-oriented activities and tasks. Chapter 3 is organized into four families of system
life-cycle processes (technical,
management, project enabling, and
July/August 2016

Chapter 1 Introduction: 7 pages
• Develop a basis to formalize SSE discipline and
mindset
• Consider and demonstrate how SSE can be
applied to SE processes

Chapter 2 The Fundamentals: 15 pages
• Ensure appropriate security principles,
concepts, methods, and practices are applied
to adequate security claims
• Perform security analyses with the
appropriate fidelity and rigor to substantiate

Technical
Management
Processes

Chapter 3 SSE Processes, Activities, and Tasks: 128 pages
14 technical processes
(54 activities, 232 tasks)

8 technical management processes
(29 activities, 116 tasks)

6 organizational project-enabling
processes (18 activities, 57 tasks)

2 agreement processes
(10 activities, 23 tasks)

Appendixes (Guides to Fundamental Knowledge): 100+ pages
• Systems Security Activities and Tasks
• Security Requirements and Considerations
• Roles, Responsibilities, and Skills
• Hardware Security and Assurance
• Design Principles for Security
• Software Security and Assurance
• Engineering and Security Fundamentals • System Security Analyses
• System Resiliency
• Risk Management Framework

• Project Planning
• Project Assessment
and Control
• Decision Management
•...
• Configuration Management
• Information Management
• Measurement
• Quality Assurance

• Prepare for security quality assurance
• Perform product or service security evaluations
• Perform process security evaluations
• Manage quality assurance security records and reports
• Treat security incidents and problems

Detailed SSE Quality
Assurance Tasks

Figure 2. Selective overview of NIST SP 800-160 on SSE. Each process area is further elaborated on in chapter 3 of the publication, providing vast
tailorable options to secure system design. For example, the figure outlines the associated tasks to only the Quality Assurance Activity listed
under the Technical Management Processes.

agreement) with a total of 111 SSE
activities and 428 tasks across the
30 systems engineering life-cycle
processes described in ISO/IEC/
IEEE 15288.
Presented as a tailorable engineering approach to satisfy stakeholder needs, the SSE activities
extend the activities and tasks of
the parent system’s engineering lifecycle processes to directly address
security-specific considerations and
outcomes. The SSE activities are
based on well-established security
principles, concepts, methods, and
best practices; these are detailed in
several of the publication’s accompanying appendixes. The detailed
SSE tasks are designed to provide
substantiated evidence-based confidence to assert that the system
and its protective measures behave,
interact, and produce outcomes
only as specified and, therefore,
warrant the trust that stakeholders place in the system. Furthermore, to maximize the utility of
www.computer.org/security

the prescribed SSE activities and
tasks, it’s important to realize that
they’re each complex undertakings involving close coordination
among various domain experts
and stakeholders throughout
each of the systems engineering
processes. This holistic approach
serves to build a multidisciplinary
approach to engineering secure
trustworthy systems.13

Applying SSE Activities
and Tasks

As systems increase in size and
complexity, they become more
susceptible to a wide range of malicious and nonmalicious disruptive
events.8 Moreover, critical systems
(those with unrecoverable loss consequences) are increasingly characterized by reliance on distributed
technologies that provide a range
of automated and autonomous
capabilities. These systems might
include automotive assembly lines,
banking and financial systems,

communication networks, cyberphysical systems, systems of systems, military weapon systems, and
the Internet of Things. Regardless
of the system type, size, or complexity, NIST SP 800-160 is applicable,
offering a customizable “development kit” for delivering trustworthy
secure systems.
Thus, as system security engineers constrained by real-world
costs and timelines, we’re interested in more fully understanding
how to effectively apply the 111
SSE activities and associated 428
tasks of NIST SP 800-160. In future
work, we’ll study how to best apply
the tailorable SSE processes, activities, and tasks to different classes
of development (for instance, new
acquisitions or legacy systems)
and types of systems (for instance,
distributed cybersystems, autonomous transportation systems, airliners, satellites, and control systems)
to make better-informed securityrelated tradeoffs.15 Moreover, we’re
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interested in examining the level of
effort (that is, the number of system
security engineers, systems engineers, and other security-minded
professionals) necessary to successfully execute the proposed SSE
activities and tasks.

S

SE is increasingly recognized as
an important specialty domain,
responsible for the trustworthiness of complex systems. Although
several standards and publications
exist in the cybersecurity space,
NIST SP 800-160 uniquely delivers a systems-oriented approach
to ensuring stakeholder security
requirements and protection needs
are met with appropriate fidelity
and rigor. More specifically, the
SSE activities and tasks described
in NIST SP 800-160 provide a
comprehensive set of systems security considerations for engineering
more defensible and survivable systems while facing untold disruptions, losses, hazards, and threats.
As the most systematic treatment of
systems security available to date,
NIST SP 800-160 is sure to impact
both the theory and practice of SSE
as it’s adopted and applied across
various commercial, government,
and military systems.
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4. Universally Applicable Systems Security Domains
4.1. Description
This work introduces SSE concepts, methodologies, and frameworks, as well as
discusses several competing systems security concepts and outlining their respective
security fields. In doing so, this work analyzes the constituent parts of the systems
security problem through a systems security perspective by defining seven system
agnostic security domains in order to better address the SSE problem holistically.
These abstracted domains serve as a common baseline for implementing SSE
while thoroughly understanding and discussing the system security problem in addition to
building confidence in inter-organizational activities such as developing security
standards and effective security practices. The utility of these security domains are
further amplified as the Authors provide three example prioritization schemes based on
the importance (or criticality) of each security domain according to particular system
types or classes. This allows organizations to determine which domains are more
important and therefore warrant more resources.
As a result, this work represents essential knowledge for understanding how to
more effectively apply SSE processes for engineering trustworthy and secure systems. By
utilizing this concept with well-established SSE activities and tasks, this effort identifies
a means for analyzing the SSE approach and understanding where to focus limited
resources to maximize the stakeholders’ security and return on investment.

20

4.2. Publication Details
Title: System-Agnostic Security Domains for Understanding and Prioritizing
Systems Security Engineering Efforts
Publication: IEEE Access
Date: Accepted February 2017

21

System-Agnostic Security Domains for
Understanding and Prioritizing Systems
Security Engineering Efforts
S. Khou, L.O. Mailloux, Member, IEEE, J. M. Pecarina, and M. A. McEvilley

Abstract—As modern systems continue to increase in size and
complexity, current systems security practices lack an effective
approach to prioritize and tailor systems security efforts to
successfully develop and field systems in challenging operational
environments. This work uniquely proposes seven systemagnostic security domains which assist in understanding and
prioritizing Systems Security Engineering (SSE) efforts. To
familiarize the reader with the state-of-the-art in SSE practices,
we first provide a comprehensive discussion of foundational SSE
concepts, methodologies, and frameworks. Next, the seven
system-agnostic security domains are presented for consideration
by researchers and practitioners. The domains are intended to be
representative of a holistic SSE approach which is universally
applicable to multiple systems classes and not just a single system
implementation. Lastly, three examples are explored to illustrate
the utility of the system-agnostic domains for understanding and
prioritizing SSE efforts in Information Technology (IT) systems,
Department of Defense (DoD) weapon systems, and cyberphysical systems.
Index
Terms—Security
Domains,
Systems
Security
Engineering, Systems Engineering, Security Engineering

I. INTRODUCTION
As modern systems continue to increase in size and
complexity, security is not adequately addressed, resulting in
key stakeholders becoming susceptible to attacks from
intelligent adversaries and a considerable array of disruptive
events [40]. These vulnerabilities often result in business and
mission losses when assets (i.e., people, processes, and
technology) are insufficiently protected; thus, allowing for
system faults, degradation, misuse, abuse, and security
violations. Such losses can even result in mission failure and
financial ruin, as well as, reduced trust from key stakeholders.
In a recent call to arms, Principal Deputy to the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering
Kristen Baldwin stresses the need for integration and
formalization of Systems Security Engineering (SSE) methods,
processes, and tools into established systems engineering
efforts [1]. More specifically, it identifies three key trends
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• S. Khou, L.O. Mailloux, and J. M. Pecarina are with the Air Force
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which pose serious security challenges to modern programs
and systems. The first challenge describes how systems
increasingly rely on commercially available technologies;
whether open source or proprietary, cost-conscience
commercial technologies are seldom manufactured with
security in mind [1]. This means, adversaries across the world
can purchase, reverse engineer, and identify vulnerabilities in
critical systems, sub-systems, and components more easily.
The second challenge to systems security is accountability
during acquisition. Complex supply chains often obfuscate the
point of origin and composition of system components.
Furthermore, with multiple tiers of prime contractors,
subcontractors, and suppliers, the chain of custody often
becomes confusing and misreported. The third challenge is the
increasingly complex, dynamic, and interconnectedness of
systems (i.e., large Systems-of-Systems with many networked
interactions). This results in difficulty proving that systems,
across their execution states and modes, are secure. Moreover,
extensive dependencies may lead to the concealment of
lingering vulnerabilities.
To address the SSE problem holistically, this work
proposes seven system-agnostic (or system-neutral) security
domains to examine its constituent parts. While the term
“domain” may invoke particular implications depending on the
context of its use, we use it here to refer to design principles
and concepts at a system-agnostic intended for universal
applicability across a broad range of systems. This level of
abstraction is desirable to promote systems thinking and an
overarching view of systems security ideas within the systems
engineering specialty domain of SSE [2]. Note that this
“systems” approach is in contrast to most security approaches
which promote a rather narrow view of specific security
concerns within a particular application domain (e.g., mobile
computing or cloud storage systems). The domains described
in this work discuss issues pertinent to all system types
regardless of their application. In doing so, we also hope to
help practitioners and researchers uncover additional areas of
study, as the introduction of these abstracted domains
themselves do not sufficiently solve the overarching issues of
SSE complexity and non-uniformity across the spectrum of
possible systems; rather, they provide opportunities for
expansion of the concept. We stress that the proposed systemagnostic domains are not intended to be formal specifications
but merely provide an example of how security domains can
be defined and utilized for studying various Systems of
Interest (SoI).

The article is organized as follows. In Section II, a
comprehensive discussion of SSE concepts, methodologies,
and frameworks is provided for the reader. We also outline
their respective security domains, noting that the
preponderance of existing frameworks are intended for
Information Technology (IT) and cybersecurity applications.
Section III proposes seven system-agnostic security domains
for understanding how to more effectively apply SSE efforts.
This work is not intended to provide a new standard, but rather
an approach for prioritizing the SSE processes, activities, and
tasks as described in the recently published National Institute
of Standards and Technology Special Publication (NIST SP)
800-160 Systems Security Engineering [14].
Section IV provides example methods and suggestions for
developing prioritization schemes based on the importance (or
criticality) of each security domain according to the particular
SoI type or class. Finally, in Section V, we conclude with a
discussion on the implications of our work and outline future
research goals. Ultimately, this work seeks to extend the
baseline knowledge of systems security engineers and those
responsible for executing SSE roles and responsibilities [43].
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we offer the reader foundational background
knowledge on the development of SSE. In doing so, we note
that the majority of security literature speaks to security only
from an IT or cybersecurity perspective. While systems
security has been studied for many decades, a fully
encompassing philosophy ensuring that our daily personal and
professional activities remain secure has yet to surface due to a
lack of fundamental science underlying current security
practices [42].
A. History of Systems Security Engineering (SSE)
Early security research efforts by the United States
Department of Defense (DoD) focused on the challenge of how
to build and assure computing systems with the correct level of
protection [6], [34]. These efforts culminated in the Trusted
Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), commonly
referred to as the “Orange Book” in 1983 [4]. Of note, the
Orange Book set basic requirements for assessing the
effectiveness of security controls built into computer systems
and was primarily used to evaluate, classify, and select
computer systems for processing, storage, and retrieval of
sensitive or classified information. Despite their focus on
computer security, early works recognized the foundational
systems nature of their task [6]. For example, the 1970 Defense
Science Board Task Force on Computer Security concluded
that providing satisfactory security controls in a computer
system is itself a system design problem [6]. Moreover, the
board specifically identified security as a systems problem: “a
combination of hardware, software, communications, physical,
personnel, policy and procedural safeguards” [6].
In 1989, the DoD formalized this systems security concept
in Military Standard 1785 (MIL-STD 1785), which defined the
technical and managerial aspects of SSE for the first time [7].
Subsequently, the National Security Agency (NSA) created a
draft set of secure design principles in 1993, which emerged
from a study on rules for system composition [8], [35]. While
not a finished effort, the study represented collective wisdom
that needed to stand the test of time, and perhaps more

importantly, practice. Additionally, in response to
recommendations by the US National Research Council in
December of 1990 to promulgate comprehensive, generally
accepted security principles, the International Information
Security Foundation (IISF) began drafting the Generally
Accepted System Security Principles (GASSP) [8], [9].
Originally drafted in 1992, it was left unfinished until its
adoption by NIST in 1996 (NIST SP 800-14 Generally
Accepted Principles and Practices for Security Information
Technology Systems [10]) and later the Information Systems
Security Association in 2003 (Generally Accepted Information
Security Principles [9]).
B. IT Focused Security Efforts
While initial systems security efforts served to protect
information systems well, a holistic systems-oriented view of
security was largely overshadowed by the rapid development
of network security and information assurance during the IT
bubble of the 1990s and early 2000s. In the meantime, other
countries began their own initiatives to develop evaluation
criteria influenced largely by the concepts presented in the
United States’ TCSEC. These included the Information
Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC), published in
1991 by the Commission of the European Communities
(largely based on works from France, Germany, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) [11], as well as, the
Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria
(CTCPEC), published in 1993 by the Communications
Security Establishment [12]. The TCSEC, ITSEC, and
CTCPEC efforts eventually culminated in an international
collaboration in 1999 to produce ISO/IEC 15408: Information
technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT
security, otherwise known as the Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation (often
abbreviated as “Common Criteria” or simply “CC”). The
Common Criteria provides a shared set of requirements for the
security functionality of IT products and for assurance
measures applied to these technologies [13].
C. A Resurgence of Systems-Oriented Security
More recently, a collaborative effort between NIST and
NSA was formed in 2010 to continue the systems approach to
security MIL-STD 1785 began some 20 years prior. In 2012,
the initial public draft of NIST SP 800-160 Systems Security
Engineering was published (with the full release version
published November 2016), providing a comprehensive
description of systems-oriented security engineering
considerations [2], [14]. Likewise, in 2011 the United States
DoD publicly acknowledged the need for an integrated
approach for developing secure systems as they revitalized
their SSE approach through established methodologies such as
Program Protection Planning (i.e., SE processes throughout the
system lifecycle) [1], [15]. Similarly, the on-line Guide to the
Systems Engineering Body of Knowledge (SEBoK) recognizes
that the primary objective of SSE is to apply SE principles and
practices during all system development phases in order to
minimize (or contain) system vulnerabilities to known and
postulated security threats, ensuring that developed systems are
adequately protected [16].
D. Modern SSE Concepts and Frameworks
In this section we introduce foundational SSE concepts and
review several popular security frameworks. Experience has

shown that systems often exhibit behaviors that are
unanticipated in the design process, even when formal design
process exists [5]. Fundamental analysis of system security,
and thus risk to successful mission execution, requires
necessarily anticipating conditions in which the SoI is forced
outside its normal operating constraints. Furthermore, these
analyses are complicated by the high degree of connectivity
between independently managed systems, where formal
assessments can be prohibited by the affected systems’
management [17].
With regard to the challenge of developing secure systems,
security expert Ross Anderson observed that security
engineering is about building systems to remain reliable
through intentional and unintentional disruption, to include
malice, error, or mischief [18]. In the same respect, the need for
cyber resiliency has been increasingly recognized in recent
years; there is a need for information and communications
systems and the missions and business functions which depend
on them to be resilient under attacks focused on cyber
resources [41]. Thus, SSE has two predominate roles within the
larger SE effort:
• Engineering the security functions that provide system
security protection
• Engineering the security-driven constraints on the entire
system
Note, a possible third role exists in the engineering of
protection for life cycle assets as exemplified in aspects of
DoD Program Protection [15]. Successful execution of these
roles requires a tailored SSE “presence” throughout the 30 SE
life cycle processes of ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 [5]. While metaengineering SSE methodologies may exist, such as the Systems
Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM)
(which has evolved into ISO/IEC 21827), the majority of
security literature speaks to security only from an IT or
cybersecurity perspective [44]. For example, two of the most
predominantly exercised methodologies and frameworks for
understanding, developing, and fielding secure systems are the
Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP)
[19] and the ISO/IEC 27002: Information technology —
Security techniques — Code of practice for information
security management [20]. The CISSP provides a Common
Body of Knowledge (CBK) relevant to information security
professionals and establishes a common framework for
information security terms and principles which allows
professionals to discuss, debate, and resolve related matters
with a common understanding [19]. Conversely, the ISO/IEC
27002 provides recommendations on IT and cybersecurity
management for use by those responsible for initiating,
implementing or maintaining IT and cybersecurity security
management systems [20].
On the other hand, methodologies like the SSE-CMM
deliver the necessary roadmap for adopting organization-wide
security engineering practices, but do not specifically point out
any tools or techniques that can be used to help reach the goals
described in the process areas [44], [45]. They are rather used
as a means for engineering organizations to evaluate their
existing security engineering practices and define
improvements to them [44], [45].

Summarized in Table I, six commonly referenced security
frameworks include the United States Department of Health
and Human Services 45 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
Part 95, Subpart: F [21]; ISO/IEC 27002 [20]; Federal
Information Processing Standards 200 (FIPS 200) [22]; the
International Information System Security Certification
Consortium (ISC)2 CISSP CBK [19]; the Department of
Homeland Security’s (DHS) Transportation Systems SectorSpecific Plan, an annex to their National Infrastructure
Protection Plan [23]; and the DHS Catalog of Control Systems
Security for protecting critical infrastructure [24]. Collectively,
these works outline provisions for establishing a minimum
baseline or system-agnostic security considerations (each from
their respective area), which are often acknowledged in
multiple concepts or frameworks (as described in Section III).
While this is not an exhaustive list of all existing security
frameworks, it endeavors to be representative sample of these
frameworks. In particular, there work offers representation for
traditional IT and cybersecurity systems, cyber-physical
systems, transportation systems, industrial control systems, and
government requirements on similar systems; this subset
provides a diverse yet comprehensive sampling of possible
systems.
TABLE I
SECURITY FRAMEWORKS
Security
Framework
45 CFR Part
95 (1990)
FIPS 200
(2006)
Transportation
Systems
SectorSpecific Plan
(2010)
Catalog of
Control
Systems
Security for
CIKR (2011)
ISO 27002
(2013)

CISSP (2015)

Description
Outlines provisions for establishing minimum standard
requirements for the security of all developmental or
operational federally funded automatic data processing
systems
Addresses the specification of minimum security
requirements for federal information and information
systems
Describes collaboratively developed strategies to reduce
risks to critical transportation infrastructure and build a
set of programs and initiatives to reduce the sector’s
most significant risks in an efficient, practical, and costeffective manner
Presents a compilation of practices that various industry
bodies have recommended to increase the security of
control systems from both physical and non-physical
(cyber) attacks and is specifically designed to provide
the framework needed to develop sound security
standards, guidelines, and best practices
Provides recommendations on IT and cybersecurity
management for use by those responsible for initiating,
implementing or maintaining IT and cybersecurity
security management systems
Establishes a common framework of information
security terms and principles which allows for
professionals to discuss, debate and resolve related
matters with a common understanding

III. EXAMINING THE SYSTEMS SECURITY DOMAINS
This section proposes seven abstracted systems security
domains to broadly describe a “system-agnostic” approach for
universally understanding and categorizing systems security
concerns into distinct domains. In Table II, we map the six
frameworks and their associated domains from Table I into
seven recommended system-agnostic domains. The abstracted
domains are intended to serve as a common baseline for
implementing SSE while thoroughly understanding and
discussing the systems security problem in addition to building
confidence in inter-organizational activities such as developing
security standards and effective security practices. These

domains also infer that the complexity and diversity of security
needs and domains that contribute to system security is indeed
“defense in depth,” a commonly applied architecture and
design approach which implements a composition of various
defenses and countermeasures to provide multiple
opportunities to stop an attack using different techniques and/or
tools in the event a security control fails [19].

SystemAgnostic
Mapping

TABLE II
SECURITY DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS
Associated Security Domains
(from the security frameworks listed in Table I)

Auditb,d; Accountabilityb,d; Planningb,c,d;
Certificationb; Accreditationb; Assessmentsb,d;
Compliance
Policyd,e; Organizational Securitya,d; Monitoringd;
Reviewingd; Risk Managementd,f; Compliancee
Awareness b,c,d; Training b,c,d; Identificationb;
People
Authenticationb; Personnel Securitya,b,d; Screeningc;
Preparednessc; Responsec; Human Resourcese
System
Contingency Planninga,b,c; Disaster Recoveryf;
Resiliency
Managemente,f; Business Continuitye,f
Emergency Preparednessa; Risk Analysisa;
Access Controlb,d,e,f; Incident Responseb,d;
System Integrityb,d; Information Integrity b,d;
Risk Assessmentb,c; Vulnerability Assessmentc;
Operations
Software Development Securityf; Information
Managementd,e; Document Managementd; Security
Program Managementd; Operations Securitye,f;
Cryptographye; Security Engineeringf; Security
Assessmentf; Security Testingf
Physical and
Physical Securitya,b,c,d,e,f; Environmental
Environmental
Protectionb,d,e,f
Equipment Securitya; Software Securitya; Data
Securitya; Configuration Managementb,c;
Maintenanceb,d,e; Media Protectionb,d; System
Acquisitionb,d,e; Service Acquisitionb,d; Leveraging
Asset
Management
Technologiesc; Cyber Critical Infrastructure
Securityc; System Developmentd; System
Maintenancee; Media Protectiond; Asset
Managemente,f; Supplier Relationshipse
Telecommunication Securitye; System
Interconnectivity
Protectionb,d; Communication Protectionb,d,e,f;
Network Securityf
References: a. 45 CFR Part 95 [21], b. FIPS 200 [22], c. Transportation
Systems Sector-Specific Plan [23], d. Catalog of Control Systems
Security [24], e. ISO 27002 [20], f. CISSP [19].

Note that systems developers (i.e., practicing Systems
Engineers) may partition security into domains with varying
detail and specificity. As such, the existing security domains
may not map directly to the proposed system-agnostic
domains; however, the goal is merely to map the domains as
close as possible in order to represent the intention of the
domain as described by its framework. For example, the Asset
Management domain can be further partitioned into hardware,
software, and operating systems to more specifically account
for physical material and components (e.g., hard drives, car
doors, fuselages, etc.), the mechanisms used to provide
functionality to systems (e.g., human-machine interfaces,
hardware logic, software applications, etc.), and the platform
that the applications reside on (e.g., operating systems, virtual
machines, web interfaces, etc.). The problem with this systems
security approach, though, is the translation from one
framework to another: the concepts are similar but often
expressed with varying lexicon. Also, some domains may
have interdependencies with other domains that may need to

be considered, such as communications and network
equipment (Interconnectivity) needing to be managed (Asset
Management) and protected (Physical and Environmental
security).
A. Compliance
Compliance addresses the security policies of the
organization, provides the organization direction, and supports
security in accordance with business or mission requirements,
alongside applicable legal, statutory, and regulatory
requirements. While many believe, security is primarily based
on locks and walls to prevent access, there are many times
when security depends on deterrence including the possibility
of punishment; this is the role of policy and laws [25]. For
example, while cars have door locks, it is often the possibility
of a thief getting caught and sent to jail, which, while small, is
large enough to deter all but the most determined criminals.
As such, there are many different forms of punishment to
include fines, ostracism, firing, jail, and other creative
alternatives that can be incorporated into compliance policies
and laws [25].
This domain also serves as an important form of internal
control to limit unwanted behaviors from employees and
includes investigative measures to determine if an incident has
occurred as well as the processes for responding to such
incidents. Well-written policies convey to employees what is
expected of them, leaving the organization free to focus on
other security and management priorities. Additionally,
adherence to compliance requirements also helps to maintain a
degree of accountability in the eyes of external (and internal)
stakeholders.
B. People
Because modern systems currently, and will continue to,
depend on people for development and operation, most
vulnerabilities tend to occur at the human level [26], [39]. For
example, Kevin Mitnick, a computer security consultant once
known as the world’s most wanted hacker, stated that as “better
security technologies, [make] it increasingly difficult to exploit
technical vulnerabilities… attackers will turn more and more to
exploiting the human element” [26]. His work recognizes that
attackers pay more attention to the human element in security
than most system developers have, and consequently hackers
have managed to successfully exploit this advantage repeatedly
with little investment and minimal risk. Therefore, the security
roles and responsibilities of employees, contractors and third
parties are critically important and should be defined and
documented in accordance with the organization’s policies and
overall competitive strategy. At a minimum, background
checks on all potential employees should be conducted in
accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and ethics in
relation to the business needs and the perceived risks [20].
Furthermore, motivation to comply is often based on the
users’ understanding of why their actions and behaviors can
put organizational assets at risk [26]. Education, training, and
certification needs to instill personal and collective
responsibility in all users to include security designers,
administrators, decision makers, and end users. Note there is a
point of distinction to make between education and training:

education is largely about teaching concepts and skills whereas
training aims to change behavior through drill, monitoring,
feedback, reinforcement, and punishment [26]. By
incorporating both security education and training into every
task the user does, the organization puts security into the
forefront of people’s minds on a daily basis, which allows them
to focus on the necessary actions to protect themselves, as well
as, the organization’s data, networks, and systems.
C. System Resiliency
The system must also be able to continue its mission during
critical failures while protecting its people and assets
regardless of internal and external conflict or attacks,
unforeseen environmental or operational changes, and system
malfunctions [28], [29]. While each component of the system
itself may be secure and reliable, demonstrating (or proving)
that the whole system is resilient becomes much harder.
System Resiliency requires processes to identify and mitigate
design, production, test, and field support deficiencies which
threaten mission success [27]. Additionally, resiliency with
respect to system security also means providing justified
confidence that the SoI security functions as only intended and
is free of exploitable vulnerabilities, either intentionally or
unintentionally designed or inserted as part of the system [27].
The complete system must meet stakeholder expectations
and needs while also addressing their security concerns by
performing traceability of system security requirements. Note
that the stakeholder requirements are the results of
requirements analysis to transform the informal needs,
expectations, and concerns into something that can be
delivered. The system requirements transform the stakeholder
expression into the technical solution that will be delivered.
To be effective, claims should be addressed early and
proportionately with stakeholder needs and expected threats.
Activities should include a planned systematic set of multidisciplinary activities to achieve adequate evidence for system
resiliency and manage the risk of exploitable vulnerabilities
[27]. Incorrectly addressing concerns late in the engineering
process could result in the system being misused, resulting in
unnecessary costs or delays in full system operations [27].
D. Operations
Operations security (and by extension sustainment,
maintenance, and logistics) focuses on providing system
availability for end users while protecting sensitive data and
important resources [19], [20]. From a systems-level
perspective, Operations includes the collection of mechanisms
and procedures that allow system managers to exercise
directive or restrictive influence over the behavior, use, and
content of the system; however, due to the prevailing nature of
software applications in today’s systems, it is important to note
that fundamental cybersecurity principals from programs and
standards such as the CISSP and the ISO/IEC 27002 have a
large impact in securing this domain. Properties such as access
control, cryptography, application development, and
information security play crucial roles in keeping this domain
secure. For example, access control permits management to
specify what users or processes can do, which resources they
can access, and what operations they can perform on a system
[19].

E. Physical and Environmental
Physical and environmental security addresses the physical
and procedural issues that exist in the environment in which the
SoI is to be deployed and operated/sustained. This domain is
concerned with the prevention of unauthorized physical access,
damage, and interference to the system, as well as measures to
prevent loss, damage, theft, or compromise of assets [20].
Some systems may require more physical security
considerations than other systems due to a tightly coupled
cyber-physical relationship. For example, Industrial Control
Systems (ICS) like power plants or waste water treatment
plants are considered critical infrastructures which merit higher
levels of physical security in order to prevent tampering.
Similarly, classified or consolidated IT systems such as
military networks and service delivery points may also warrant
high levels of physical security due to the sensitive and
important nature of the service they provide. Conversely,
conventional organizational IT systems (e.g., servers, desktop
computers, etc.), may not require significant physical security
consideration because these systems are often integrated into
larger systems or “businesses” in which physical security has
already been provided.
F. Asset Management
Asset management describes the assets that the SoI utilizes
to operate such as people, intellectual property, system
components, and the acquisition of such assets (i.e., supply
chain management). This domain encompasses both high-level
and more detailed processes, concepts, principles, structures,
and standards used to define, design, implement, monitor, and
secure/assure operating systems, applications, equipment, and
networks [19]. For data components, the domain should also
clearly integrate various levels of confidentiality, integrity, and
availability to ensure effective operations and adherence to
governance. This domain can be further subdivided into three
components:
i.

Hardware
Of the many components that compose a technological
product, and ultimately the system, most contain elements from
the broader global market, making it difficult to establish the
trustworthiness and security of an end product [30]. As demand
drives competition, many companies are forced to outsource in
order to lower costs and remain competitive. This can be seen
in the U.S. computer manufacturing sector, which in the first
half of the decade has declined at an annual rate of 21.8 percent
as computer manufacturing has increasingly moved abroad
[30]. As manufacturers lose direct control of production quality
and product integrity, this outsourcing process can be misused
by others to introduce malicious logic into unsuspecting
devices. More often than not, hardware failure or cyber-attacks
would likely be suspected before malicious hardware,
especially since diagnostic tests might not find proof of
malicious actions [30]. These devices may also contain hidden
backdoors which are equally difficult to detect.
ii.

Software
Software (applications or firmware) can also be subject to
compromise as complex systems are typically implemented by
a large number of developers across a number of companies
[1]. In March 2013, a study by the International Data

Corporation found that “at least a third of all PC software is
counterfeit” because of its nonphysical nature [30],
significantly increasing the potential for malware infection and
application performance degradation. Conversely, sometimes
vulnerabilities in technology are simply design or
implementation mistakes; however, malicious or not,
vulnerabilities in software can be, and often are, used for
malicious ends, be it cyber-attacks or espionage [36].
iii.

Operating Systems
Operating systems are also subject to multiple programmers
or outsourcing, which, like in the case of hardware and
software, can introduce supply chain compromises. Modern
operating systems contain millions of lines of codes with
numerous undetected or undetectable vulnerabilities. Because
of the crucial role of the operating system in any computing
system, the security (or lack thereof) of an operating system
has a significant impact on the overall security of the system,
including the security of dependent applications (i.e., the
software running on the operating system) [31]. Lack of proper
control and containment of execution of individual applications
in an operating system may lead to attack or break-in from one
application to other applications [31].
G. Interconnectivity
Communications and network security can be described as
the cornerstones of information security, being one of the most
central assets to the information environment of any system
[38]. Loss of interconnectivity can have devastating
consequences on the SoI and its ability to operate, which often
leads to mission failure. This domain then refers to not only
the transmission methods and security measures used to
provide integrity, availability, and confidentiality of data
during transfer over private and public communication
networks but also the intercommunication between
components within a system, such as a vehicle control area
network bus which allows microcontrollers and other devices
in a vehicle to communicate with each other without the
presence of a host computer. Likewise, using the appropriate
security protocols ensures that security and integrity of data in
transit persist as these protocols are primarily designed to
prevent any unauthorized user, application, service, or device
from accessing data by implementing various cryptography
and encryption techniques.
IV. EXAMPLE PRIORITIZATION SCHEMES
This section provides three example prioritization schemes
(i.e., possible interpretations) using available frameworks to
demonstrate the utility of the system-agnostic domains. It is
also important to note that many organizations adopt control
frameworks to provide a governance structure that is
consistent, measurable, standardized, comprehensive, and
modular [19]; however, there is often no standard or
methodology for determining the “criticality” or importance of
such efforts with respect to existing security domains. Thus,
information about each domain must be considered and
combined by SMEs to get a true understanding of its priority
and determine proper courses of action. For example, should
developmental and operational tests lack adequate SSE
process controls and appropriate design features, planning and

engineering efforts could be wasted if vulnerabilities go
undiscovered.
Decisions regarding when, where, and how these systemagnostic security domains should be used are best determined
by the specific industry sectors and the SMEs associated with
those systems. Thus, these examples are not intended to
replace the need for applying sound engineering judgment,
established best practices, or risk assessments, but rather
function as an example use case for further analysis and
consideration for engineering complex systems. More
specifically, we examine three well-established frameworks
and attempt to create mappings from their criticality
assessment back to the system-agnostic security domains
described in Section III. In this way, we construct
prioritization schemes that determine, based on what controls
is assumed to matter more for the system or organization, how
to organize the security domains in level of importance for the
system developer.
Note, the notion of using a weighted priority scheme (i.e.,
using multiplicative factors to influence the perceived
importance of particular categories or domains) allows for a
finer level of granularity and detail, but was ultimately omitted
in this work in order to minimize the complexity of the issue
and prevent possible obfuscation of the necessary components.
To provide a broad systems security perspective and
demonstrate wide applicability, we addressed security
guidance from the conventional IT industry [32], government
specific acquisition [15], and critical infrastructure [24]. It
must be emphasized again that as these are sample scenarios,
the values and order of importance may change depending on
the background and expertise of the individual or individuals
implementing this concept.
A. NIST SP 800-53 Revision 4
The first example is the NIST SP 800-53r4 Security and
Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and
Organizations, consisting of 285 controls in 19 families [32].
This publication provides for the ability to scope and tailor
controls to an organization’s specific mission (or user
requirements) and provides best practice recommendations for
information security management by those initiating,
implementing, or maintaining information security systems. By
categorizing the 19 control families and mapping them back to
the proposed security domains, we derive Table III. These 19
control families are listed along the left column of Table III and
serve as consideration or control factors to help determine how
much a given security domain would impact or influence the
system, as determined by the SME. While the NIST SP 80053r4 provides a holistic approach to information security by
providing the breadth and depth of security controls necessary
to fundamentally strengthen information systems and the
environments in which those systems operate, this assessment
looks to apply those same security control families as a set of
defined requirements used to satisfy the system-agnostic
security domains.
With respect to the sums in Table III, once each control is
associated with its respective security domains, we can assert
that larger security domain values imply a more weighted or

critical importance to the system utilizing this particular
prioritization scheme. For example, the Media Protection
control family can apply directly to the Physical and
Environmental security domain as well as the Asset
Management domain. For this particular scheme then,
Compliance should be weighted more heavily than the
commonly emphasized Operations security domain. While all
security domains are important, this prioritization allows ITfocused organizations to focus their resources more
specifically.

components and information for mission-critical functions.
From these results, we assert that security domains with larger
sum values imply more importance to the SoI. In this example,
System Resiliency and Asset Management share equally high
sum priorities of “3”.
C. SCADA Security Policy Framework
The final prioritization example uses the Framework for
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Security
Policy, developed by Sandia National Laboratories in an effort
to ease the creation of SCADA security policies and ensuring
coverage over all critical areas of SCADA security as well as
flexibility in developing customized policies for specific
operations [33]. Because SCADA systems are often used to
control time-critical functions, standard IT security practices
may not be particularly suitable for SCADA systems [33].
Although the framework describes a methodology to
creating SCADA specific policy documents, the policy itself
translates the organization’s desired security and reliability
control objectives into enforceable direction and behavior for
the staff to ensure secure design, implementation, and
operation [33]. In this fashion, we strive not to explicitly
exclude this type of framework from applicability in our
system-agnostic approach. As shown in Table V, we can
rationally map each category to the system-agnostic security
domains to create a SCADA specific prioritization scheme.
Again, the larger the sum value for a security domain implies
more importance of that domain to the system. In this
example, the domain of most concern is the Asset
Management domain with a value of “4”.

B. Defense Acquisition Guidebook
In 2012, the Defense Science Board Task Force concluded
that the cyber threat was serious and that the United States
could not be confident that its critical information and cyber
systems would work under sophisticated and well-resourced
cyber attacks [40]. While the DoD takes great care to secure
the use and operation of its weapon systems, its networks are
built on inherently insecure architectures that are increasingly
composed of foreign assets [40]. The Defense Acquisition
Guidebook (DAG) provides details on integrating classical
systems engineering processes for mitigating and managing
risks to unprecedented technologies and mission-critical
system functionality throughout the acquisition lifecycle [15].
More specifically, Chapter 13 of the DAG (Program
Protection) provides detailed procedural steps in performing
criticality analysis, the DoD’s method by which missioncritical components and information are identified and
prioritized. In essence, program protection seeks to defend
warfighting capabilities by keeping secret things from getting
out and malicious things from getting in [15], [37].

D. Implications of the SSE Domains
Tables III, IV, and V demonstrate that the prioritization
orders for the three system frameworks are vastly different
from one another given these specific mappings (which

Leveraging
this
methodology,
another
example
prioritization scheme is generated, as shown in Table IV.
Here, the criticality analysis procedural steps are assessed
against the security domains, which we treat like critical
NIST SP 800-53r4
Access Control
Awareness and Training
Audit and Accountability
Security Assessment and Authorization
Configuration Management
Contingency Planning
Identification and Authentication
Incident Response
Maintenance
Media Protection
Physical and Environmental Protection
Planning
Program Management
Personnel Security
Risk Assessment
System and Services Acquisition
System and Communication Protection
System and Information Integrity
Privacy Controls
Sum

TABLE III
PRIORITY SCHEME FOR NIST SP 800-53R4
System
Physical and
Compliance
People
Operations
Resiliency
Environmental
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Asset
Management

Interconnectivity
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
7

5

3

3

6

4

5

presumably represent the stakeholders’ priorities). For
example, the NIST SP 800-53r4 prioritizes Compliance
whereas the DAG is more inclined to require fairly equal
attention in System Resiliency as well as Asset Management.
These results show that the proposed system-agnostic security
domains can serve as a basis for further developing and
tailoring systems specific security frameworks, processes, and
requirements efforts. By utilizing and extending this concept
with well-established SSE processes, activities, and tasks, we
desire to increase understanding of SSE approaches in order to
focus limited resources and maximize return on investment.

and quantifying such an approach for systems in development.
In future efforts, we desire to re-evaluate the proposed list
of system-agnostic domains and further elaborate on them as
well as appending overlooked domains into the current
decomposition. We also seek to incorporate our assessment
methods alongside NIST SP 800-160 Systems Security
Engineering: Considerations for a Multidisciplinary Approach
in the Engineering of Trustworthy Secure Systems to aid in the
development of trustworthy secure systems that are fully
capable of supporting critical missions and business operations
while meeting stakeholder security objectives and protection
needs [14]. Thus, we desire to investigate the tailorable nature
of NIST SP 800-160 and explore how to more efficiently
apply the SSE processes, activities, and tasks to various SoI
(e.g., smart vehicles, major weapon systems, and industrial
control systems). Our research goal is to more fully
understand an effective systems security approach, increase
the manageability of SSE efforts, and provide cost effective
SSE solutions.

V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
This paper provides a comprehensive description of
foundational SSE concepts and frameworks for the interested
reader, and proposes seven system-agnostic security domains
for consideration to prioritize and address system security
issues in complex systems. In contrast to the preponderance of
“cyber” focused security research, this work focuses more
holistically on SSE in order to create a system-agnostic
approach for various types and classes of systems to include:
cyber-physical, transportation, weapons systems, and other
complex systems or systems of systems.

DISCLAIMER
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors
and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United
States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government.

The abstracted domains allow users and practitioners to
focus on systems in general as opposed to specific systems
designed for a specialized purpose. While more attention to
detail can be given by a SME to his/her particular system, this
preliminary approach allows for a standard baseline to be
created such that new practitioners in the field have a starting
guide to developing secure systems of their own. This work
could potentially save, at the very least, the initial cost of
understanding the majority of non-specialized security
requirements, to providing an effective method for prioritizing

Defense Acquisition Guidebook
Missions/Mission-Essential Functions
Critical Subsystems, Configuration Items,
and Components
Initial Start Conditions
Operating Environment
Critical Suppliers
Sum

SCADA Security Policy Framework
Data Security
Platform Security
Communication Security
Personnel Security
Configuration Management
Audit
Applications
Physical Security
Manual Operations
Sum

The author's affiliation with The MITRE Corporation is
provided for identification purposes only, and is not intended
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the positions, opinions or viewpoints expressed by the author.

TABLE IV
PRIORITY SCHEME FOR THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION GUIDEBOOK
System
Physical and
Compliance People
Operations
Resiliency
Environmental
X
X
X
X

X

X
X

X
X
1

3

1

1

TABLE V
PRIORITY SCHEME FOR THE FRAMEWORK FOR SCADA SECURITY POLICY
System
Physical and
Compliance People
Operations
Resiliency
Environmental
X
X
X
X
X

Interconnectivity

X

X
X
2

Asset
Management
X

X

3

Asset
Management
X
X

2

Interconnectivity
X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X

2

X

X

3

2

3

3

4

2
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5. A Framework for Prioritizing SSE Processes, Activities, and Tasks
5.1. Description
While there are many excellent security frameworks and methodologies available,
there are few references written to equip the Systems Engineer to intelligently engage the
established security community. This paper provides a framework for more fully
understanding and prioritizing the application of SSE processes, activities, and tasks as
described in the NIST SP 800-160. This work extends the system agnostic domains
concepts introduced in chapter 4 by presenting a methodology which examines, maps,
and prioritizes the SSE processes, activities, and tasks to the system agnostic domains.
This paper studies explicit relationships between processes and activities as noted
in the NIST SP 800-160 and highlights areas of interest within the NIST SP 800-160 for
the Systems Engineer. This mapping affords the Systems Engineer another opportunity at
further tailoring the NIST SP 800-160 to their specific needs. The resulting SSE
framework offers a repeatable and tailorable methodology which allows system
developers to systematically focus on particular SSE processes, activities, and tasks in
order to support critical missions and business operations while also meeting stakeholder
security objectives and protection needs. This framework creates a bridge between
experts and those looking to apply state of the art SSE practices by offering a
prioritization tool to reduce some of the decision-makers’ required knowledge and time.
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Abstract—This paper provides a framework for more fully
understanding the application of Systems Security Engineering
(SSE) processes, activities, and tasks as described in the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special
Publication 800-160. First, a Systems Engineering perspective to
the security problem is described with an emphasis on related
systems-oriented security methodologies. Next, a proposed SSE
framework is presented; most importantly, it allows stakeholders
to tailor and prioritize their SSE efforts based on protection
needs. Lastly, three example prioritizations are detailed to
illustrate the framework’s applicability to various systems types
(conventional IT, cyber-physical, and major weapon systems).
The SSE framework (included online) offers a repeatable and
tailorable methodology which allows system developers to focus
on high Return-on-Investment (RoI) SSE processes, activities,
and tasks to more efficiently meet stakeholder protection needs.
Index Terms—Systems Security Engineering, Systems
Engineering, Security Engineering, Security Framework

I. INTRODUCTION
Current security practices lack effective methodologies to
prioritize and address system security issues in complex
systems [1], [27]. In their recent call to arms, the Principal
Deputy to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Systems Engineering Kristen Baldwin et al. stressed the need
for integration and formalization of security methods,
processes, and tools into established Systems Engineering
(SE) processes, specifically citing that one of the major
challenges to modern programs and systems was the
increasingly complex, dynamic, and interconnected
interactions of systems [3]. This challenge complicates the
ability to understand and prove that complex systems and
Systems-of-Systems (SoS), across their execution states and
modes, are secure.
To address this problem, the National Institute of Standards
and Technology Special Publication (NIST SP) 800-160
Systems Security Engineering: Considerations for a
Multidisciplinary Approach in the Engineering of Trustworthy
Secure Systems aims to aid in developing trustworthy secure
Paper submitted February 01, 2017.
• S. Khou, L.O. Mailloux, and J. M. Pecarina are with the Air Force
Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-7765 USA
(email: {Stephen.khou}, {logan.mailloux}, {john.pecarina}@afit.edu).
• M. A. McEvilley is a principle computer scientist with the MITRE
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systems that are fully capable of supporting critical missions
and business operations while meeting stakeholder security
objectives and protection needs [1]. Yet the SSE processes
activities and tasks in NIST SP 800-160 must be applied to
diverse classes of systems.
This research seeks to provide a System Security
Engineering (SSE) framework that offers a repeatable and
tailorable methodology to system developers, allowing them
to focus SSE processes, activities, and tasks to more
efficiently meet stakeholder protection needs. By doing so, we
make the following contributions:
• A provision for mapping the SSE processes and
activities to the system agnostic security domains
introduced in [2]
• A systematic application of SSE processes, activities,
and tasks to diverse classes of systems
• A graphical analysis on the tightly coupled nature of
the SSE processes as presented in the NIST SP 800-160
In Section II, a discussion of existing SSE concepts,
methodologies, and frameworks is provided for the reader.
Section III explores the SSE process relationships through
graphical analysis clustering. This application identifies and
outlines the explicit relationships between processes and
activities presented in the NIST SP 800-160. Section IV
introduces the SSE application framework by discussing
domain-to-process associations and mappings. Section V
provides a brief commentary on the implications of these
domain mappings and the ability to express particular areas of
interest in the NIST SP 800-160 for the Systems Engineer
given their own specific domain prioritization. It also provides
three examples which utilize the framework presented in
Sections III and IV to prioritize SSE efforts. Finally, in Section
VI, we conclude with a discussion on the interpretations of our
work and discuss how this research agenda can be further
explored with respect to the NIST SP 800-160. This work also
seeks to extend the baseline knowledge of practicing systems
security engineers and those responsible for SSE roles and
responsibilities [5]. Note, this work extends the author’s
previous work [2], [6], [7].

II. BACKGROUND
Despite their focus on computer security, early works
recognized the foundational systems nature of their task [6].
For example, the 1970 Defense Science Board Task Force on
Computer Security concluded that providing satisfactory
security controls in a computer system is itself a system design
problem [31]. Moreover, the board specifically identified
security as a systems problem: “a combination of hardware,
software, communications, physical, personnel, policy, and
procedural safeguards” [31].
As modern systems continue to increase in size and
complexity, systems security is not adequately addressed,
resulting in business and mission stakeholders becoming more
susceptible to a considerable array of disruptive events [1].
This is because the majority of security literature speaks to
security only from an IT or cybersecurity perspective, (e.g.,
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) [8],
Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC)
[9], Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria
(CTCPEC) [10], and ISO/IEC 15408: Information technology
— Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security
[11]).
Initially sponsored by the National Security Agency (NSA)
and developed by the International Systems Security
Engineering Association (ISSEA), the Systems Security
Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM), which
has evolved into ISO/IEC 21827, describes essential
characteristics of engineering security processes that should
exist in an organization in order to ensure quality security
engineering [32], [34]. The SSE-CMM establishes a
framework for measuring and improving performance in the
application of security engineering principles; it can be used
by engineering organizations to evaluate and refine security
engineering practices, by customers to evaluate a provider’s
security engineering capability, and by SE evaluation
organizations to establish organizational capability-based
confidences [33], [34].
While the SSE-CMM delivers the necessary roadmap for
adopting organization-wide security engineering practices, it
does not specifically point out any tools or techniques that can
be used to help reach the goals described in the process areas;
rather, it is used as a means for engineering organizations to
evaluate their security engineering practices and define
improvements to them [33], [34].
Another groundbreaking work, Ross Anderson’s Security
Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed
Systems describes the interaction between technical
engineering basics, security, human psychology, and usability
[21]. At more than one thousand pages, this comprehensive
volume details how to develop systems that stay dependable
whether faced with error or malice. As security spans a wide
gamut of disciplines, this book tries to bridge the gap between
the various disciplines while avoiding unnecessary technical
details and providing much emphasis on what can go wrong
and what one can learn from those situations. While it does
not specifically present a “systems-oriented” view of security,
it highlights numerous security considerations for a number of
distributed systems and successfully covers a wide range of
practical security issues quite well.

In addition, a risk-based methodology for addressing
security concerns in systems via the Program Protection Plan
(PPP) [3] had been developed and applied as the basis for
system security engineering for US Department of Defense
(DoD) systems. In 2011, the DoD publicly acknowledged the
need for an integrated approach for developing secure systems
as they revitalized their SSE approach through the PPP [3],
[25]. By identifying critical system components and assessing
threats and vulnerabilities of these components, the Systems
Engineer can identify and address countermeasure options for
the system. By considering these risks in early concepts,
requirements, and design trades for systems, SSE is being
integrated into SE of systems [3], [35].
Other security frameworks, such as those used to develop
the seven abstracted security domains described in [2], include
the United States Department of Health and Human Services
45 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 95, Subpart: F
[12]; ISO/IEC 27002 [13]; Federal Information Processing
Standards 200 (FIPS 200) [14]; the International Information
System Security Certification Consortium (ISC)2 CISSP CBK
[15]; the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS)
Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan, an annex to their
National Infrastructure Protection Plan [16]; and the DHS
Catalog of Control Systems Security for protecting critical
infrastructure [17]. These works outline provisions for
establishing minimum baseline or system-level security
considerations for their respective areas.
While there are many excellent security frameworks and
methodologies available, there are few references written to
equip the Systems Engineer to intelligently engage the
established security community. Of the SSE literature
available, only a few promote a systematic approach to SSE.
Furthermore, due to the constant emergence of new threats and
technologies, adopting organization wide standardization of
security concepts and practices is becoming more critical.
Of noteworthy importance is NIST SP 800-160, which
provides a systematic approach to security for Systems
Engineers and is framed around the widely accepted
international standard ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 [4]. Published in
November of 2016, after 5 years of effort and significant
reviews by subject matter experts, it is arguably the most
comprehensive statement on SSE to date, providing
foundational engineering considerations in the form of SSE
processes, activities, and tasks based on well-established
security principles, concepts, and practices. More concretely,
NIST SP 800-160 is not a standard, prescriptive checklist, or
formalized evaluation criteria – it is a multidisciplinary
engineering approach which “ensures [security] requirements
and needs are addressed with appropriate fidelity and rigor”
[4]. For an overview of NIST SP 800-160, please see [6], [7].
III. INHERENT RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SSE PROCESSES
In this work, we map the relationships between the
processes as described in the NIST SP 800-160, noting that we
assume a non-directional relationship between the processes.
The NIST SP 800-160 identifies and describes 30 SSE
processes, 111 activities, and 428 tasks. While each process
and its supporting activities and tasks can be executed as a
standalone procedure, it is often the case that each process (or

The colors partition the processes into their respective families: black represents the Technical Processes, Blue represents the Technical Management
Processes, Green represents the Organization Project-Enabling Processes, and Orange represents the Agreement Processes
.FIG. 1: RELATIONSHIP GRAPH OF SYSTEMS SECURITY ENGINEERING PROCESSES AS OUTLINED IN NIST SP 800-160.

one of its activities) has a connection, or relationship, with
another process. The NIST SP 800-160 explicitly connects
several of these processes and activities to other processes and
activities, either as inputs or outcomes of those processes and
activities.
Mapping these explicit relationships, Table A-1 (see
Appendix A) shows that many of the processes are tightly
coupled and that no process is completely isolated from any
other process. In other words, each process outcome
influences or is influenced by another process, and may not
necessarily be in the same process family. Fig. 1 details a
relationship graph (also known as a social graph) that depicts
the connective network between the processes of Table A-1
[30]. As is evident in the relationship graph, all processes are
connected in some fashion to another process.
In analyzing the relationship between these processes, we
examine clustering coefficient, as shown in Table 1. In graph
theory, the clustering coefficient is a measure of the degree to
which nodes in a graph tend to cluster together; it is a real
number between 0 and 1 in which 0 represents no clustering

and 1 represents maximal clustering [38]. More specifically,
evidence suggests that in most real-world networks, and in
particular social networks, nodes tend to create tightly knit
groups characterized by a relatively high density of ties; this
likelihood tends to be greater than the average probability of a
tie randomly established between two nodes [36], [37]. The
clustering coefficient of a graph is based on a local clustering
coefficient for each node
number of triangles connected to node 𝑖𝑖

𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = number of triples centered around node 𝑖𝑖

(1)

where a triple centered around node i is a set of two edges
connected to node i. Using NodeXL to calculate the clustering
coefficient for each process (treating them as nodes with
respect to Fig. 1), we generate the values in Table 1 [30].
The results point to the notion that 27 of the 30 processes
have some varying degree of connectedness with the other
processes, with 20 of those processes having a clustering
coefficient of 0.5 or higher. In other words, when applying any

of the SSE processes to a particular system, the system
developer must account for possible related processes in order
to maximize the development effort. We note that the
clustering coefficient for Measurement, Human Resource
Management, and Knowledge Management is 0, a value we
expect and corresponds directly to the number of connections
each process makes in Fig. 1 (and relationships identified in
Table A-1). A value of 0 does not necessarily mean there are
no connections for that node (this could instead be interpreted
as a less complete neighborhood around that particular node).
TABLE 1: CLUSTERING COEFFICIENTS FOR SSE PROCESSES ORDERED BY
VALUE FROM GREATEST TO LEAST.

Processes (Nodes)
Disposal
Integration
Quality Management
Architecture Definition
Business or Mission Analysis
Maintenance
Transition
Decision Management
Configuration Management
Operation
Verification
Infrastructure Management
Design Definition
System Requirements Definition
System Analysis
Stakeholder Needs/Req Definition
Acquisition
Implementation
Risk Management
Validation
Portfolio Management
Information Management
Project Assessment and Control
Quality Assurance
Supply
Project Planning
Life Cycle Model Management
Measurement
Human Resource Management
Knowledge Management

Clustering
Coefficient
1.000
0.867
0.800
0.773
0.689
0.689
0.667
0.650
0.633
0.628
0.621
0.619
0.590
0.583
0.583
0.564
0.536
0.533
0.525
0.500
0.476
0.415
0.375
0.345
0.333
0.286
0.167
0.000
0.000
0.000

IV. DOMAIN-TO-PROCESS ASSOCIATIONS
In order to study the efficient application of the SSE
processes, we utilize the seven abstracted system security
domains (Compliance, People, System Resiliency, Operations,
Physical and Environmental, Asset Management, and
Interconnectivity) from [2]. These domains were developed
using existing and well-established security frameworks,
extracting common elements described across many fields and
specialties without being too restrictive to one specific system.
The utility of these domains allows systems to be partitioned
into their most basic security considerations when developing
or modifying systems through the use of a priority scheme [2].
In order to better define the connection between the system

agnostic security domains and SSE, we map each domain with
possible SSE processes and activities from the NIST SP 800160. In doing so, we create a customizable framework for
stakeholders and Systems Engineers to tailor and prioritize
their SSE efforts based on protection needs.
Utilizing past and present experiences and efforts of
systems-related works such as [3], [4] and security-related
works including [5], [6], [7], we interpret the NIST SP 800160 literature descriptions of the 30 processes and 111
activities and match each activity to the corresponding system
agnostic security domain(s) [2] most closely associated with
that activity to build Table B-1 (see Appendix B). We map the
activities here because we determined that the processes
themselves do not provide enough detail for association
whereas the tasks are perhaps too detailed for our purposes.
The results are normalized on a scale from 0 to 1, with 0
having no association or relation and 1 being highly associated
or having a strong relation between the domain and the
process in question. That is, the more activities that are
associated to a given domain, the higher the correlation value
of the parent process or “hit rate” for that domain. We assume
that each positive association (i.e., each connection between a
domain and an activity) increases the overall relationship
between that domain and the activity’s parent process. Note
that as this mapping is the authors’ preliminary effort at
correlating between the domains and the literature, the
information presented in the table may not necessarily be
complete or entirely correct in its current form. It serves as an
initial baseline for discussion, and may be complicated by the
high degree of connectivity between independently managed
systems where formal assessments can often be prohibited by
the affected systems’ management [23]. Additional
elaboration or evaluation is needed as future efforts continue.
In Table 2, the SSE naming convention, as described by the
NIST SP 800-160, is established for the system life cycle
processes [4]. Each process is identified by a two-character
designation.
Plotting the developed relationships into a radar chart
(shown in Figs. 2, 3, 4, and 5), we are able to observe the
relative values (or levels of associativity) between each
domain and the NIST SP 800-160 SSE processes. This allows
us to infer, given no previous bias (i.e., we assume that all
processes, activities, and tasks were given similar and fair
assessment by the authors and reviewers of NIST SP 800-160
and are equally important in the SSE approach), what specific
process areas to explore given a specific domain of interest.
Because the system life cycle processes are organized and
grouped into four families in the NIST SP 800-160, the radar
charts are organized as such to provide a similar perspective.
Fig. 2 is the Technical Processes, Fig. 3 is the Technical
Management Processes, Fig. 4 is the Organization ProjectEnabling Processes, and Fig. 5 is the Agreement Processes.
Note, because the Agreement Processes family only contains
two processes, Fig. 5 is displayed with the information in
reverse to better display the result.

TABLE 2: PROCESS NAMES AND DESIGNATORS.
ID
Process

ID

Process

AQ

Acquisition

MS

Measurement

AR

Architecture Definition

OP

Operation

PA

Project Assessment and Control

PL

Project Planning

BA
CM

Business or Mission
Analysis
Configuration
Management

DE

Design Definition

PM

Portfolio Management

DM

Decision Management

QA

Quality Assurance

Disposal

QM

Quality Management

RM

Risk Management

DS
HR
IF
IM

Human Resource
Management
Infrastructure
Management
Information
Management

SA

System Analysis

SN

Stakeholder Needs and
Requirements Definition

IN

Integration

SP

Supply

IP

Implementation

SR

System Requirements Definition

KM

Knowledge Management

TR

Transition

LM

Life Cycle Model
Management

VA

Validation

MA

Maintenance

VE

Verification

FIG. 3: CONSOLIDATED OVERVIEW OF SSE DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE
TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT PROCESSES.

FIG. 2: CONSOLIDATED OVERVIEW OF SSE DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE
TECHNICAL PROCESSES.

FIG. 4: CONSOLIDATED OVERVIEW OF SSE DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE
ORGANIZATION PROJECT-ENABLING PROCESSES.

FIG. 5: CONSOLIDATED OVERVIEW OF SSE DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE
AGREEMENT PROCESSES.

To better understand Figs. 2–5, consider a scenario in which
the stakeholder (or project manager) considers Physical and
Environmental Security to be the system’s highest security
concern. From Fig. 2, we note that the Technical Process that
most closely concerns the Physical and Environmental
Security domain is Maintenance, with Architecture Definition,
Integration, Verification, Transition, and Validation falling
closely behind. Continuing with Figs. 3 and 4, we can see that
the Technical Management Processes that most closely
concerns the Physical and Environmental Security domain is
Quality Assurance while the Organization Project-Enabling
Processes point to Quality Management. The Agreement
Processes, from Fig. 5, shows no association to Physical and
Environmental Security. These processes have the highest
correlation or “hit rate” values for their specific process
family. Consequently, from the initial list of 30 SSE
processes, the Physical and Environment Security domain has
narrowed the system security engineer’s focus down to eight
first level SSE processes of concern, as shown in Table 3.
We can then use Fig. 1 (and Table A-1) to determine the
processes related to these eight. Accounting for the duplicates
in the additional processes provided, our final list of processes
associated with the Physical and Environmental Security
domain include: Maintenance, Architecture Definition,
Integration, Verification, Transition, Validation, Quality
Management, Quality Assurance, Project Assessment and
Control, Decision Management, Risk Management,
Configuration Management, Information Management, Life
Cycle Model Management, and Infrastructure Management
processes. Of these 15 processes, the first eight were
determined directly by the domain association to the NIST SP
800-160 whereas the remaining seven were obtained using
explicit process relationships identified in Table A-1.

TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF THE PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY
DOMAIN ASSOCIATED PROCESSES AND THEIR RELATED PROCESSES.
First Level
Related Processes
Processes
Validation; Operation; Design Management;
Maintenance
Configuration Management; Information Management;
Quality Assurance; Quality Management
Architecture
Validation; Decision Management; Risk Management;
Definition
Configuration Management; Information Management
Verification; Validation; Project Assessment and Control;
Integration
Decision Management; Risk Management; Configuration
Management; Information Management
Validation; Project Assessment and Control; Decision
Management; Risk Management; Configuration
Verification
Management; Information Management; Quality
Assurance
Validation; Operation; Project Assessment and Control;
Transition
Decision Management; Risk Management; Configuration
Management; Information Management
Project Assessment and Control; Decision Management;
Validation
Risk Management; Configuration Management;
Information Management; Quality Assurance
Quality
Project Planning; Project Assessment and Control; Quality
Management
Assurance
Quality
Information Management; Life Cycle Model Management;
Assurance
Infrastructure Management

V. IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATION EXAMPLES
The mapping of the system agonistic domains to the SSE
processes via its activities marks an attempt to focus the
Systems Engineer to specific issues or considerations during
system development. The more associated activities a process
has to a domain, the higher the chance that the process will
outweigh other processes in terms of importance using this
methodology. In doing so, this approach provides a repeatable
mechanism for the engineer to quickly determine the most
important SSE processes (in the context of their particular
system) when using the NIST SP 800-160 as a guideline for
secure system development. Of important note is that not all of
the activities and tasks in a particular process map directly to a
domain, but rather provide a starting point for focusing when
developing and maintaining systems. Similarly, tasks and
activities in “non-important” (remaining) processes should
also be considered when time and resources allow as this
approach provides a foundational approach to the issue, rather
than an all-encompassing solution.
For example, while the first level processes (those
determined using the domain-to-process mappings)
determined by domain association should take precedence
based on the system’s own criticality factors, the related
processes (or second level processes) add an additional layer
of consideration for developing sustainably secure systems.
Moreover, duplicate process listings do not necessarily
indicate that those processes are more important or that more
resources should be allocated towards those process areas;
they are a byproduct of various associations and relations that
each process shares with other processes. Further examination
and analysis needs to be conducted in order to provide an
accurate interpretation of the nature of duplicate processes.
Next, the three examples provided in [2] (conventional IT
industry [24], government specific acquisition [25], and
critical infrastructure [26]) are extended through the use of the
methodologies outlined in Sections III and IV. Decisions
regarding when, where, and how these system agnostic

security domains and their interpretations should be used are
best determined by the specific industry sectors and the
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) associated with those systems.
Thus, these examples are not intended to replace the need for
applying sound engineering judgment, established best
practices, or risk assessments, but rather function as example
use cases for further analysis and consideration for
engineering complex systems. In this way, it was possible to
construct prioritization schemes that determine, based on what
controls is assumed to matter more for the system or
organization, how to organize the security domains in level of
importance for the system developer [2].
A. NIST SP 800-53 Revision 4
The first example is the NIST SP 800-53R4 Security and
Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and
Organizations, consisting of 285 controls in 19 families [24].
This publication provides for the ability to scope and tailor
controls to an organization’s specific mission (or user
requirements) and provides best practice recommendations for
information security management by those initiating,
implementing, or maintaining information security systems.
Using the NIST SP 800-53R4 prioritization scheme [2], the
domains list by “order of importance” are: Compliance;
Physical and Environmental; People and Interconnectivity;
Asset Management; and System Resiliency and Operations.
Applying the domain-to-process methodology to the
Compliance domain, we determine the associated processes
from each of the families, summarized in Table 4. Figs. 6, 7,
and 8 display modified versions of Figs. 2, 3, and 4,
highlighting only the domain of interest (Compliance).
Similar to the sample scenario, highlighting the processes in
the relationship graph allows us to extrapolate another level
deeper into related processes. Accounting for duplicates, the
list of related processes reduces down to (in no particular
order): Stakeholder Needs and Requirements Definition,
System Analysis, Maintenance, Supply, Quality Assurance,
Human Resource Management, and Measurement. Table 5
shows the finalized list of first level processes obtained by
using the domain-to-process mapping methodology as well as
the second level related processes from the associated
relationship graph. It should be again noted that the first level
processes, given the methodology provided, should take
precedence over the related processes in terms of time and
resources due to the direct relationship that the first level
processes have with the domain, as opposed to the acquired
relationship of the related processes.
TABLE 4: NIST SP 800-5R4 FIRST LEVEL PROCESSES.
Process Families
Compliance
Business or Mission Analysis; System Requirements
Technical
Definition; Architecture Definition; Design Definition;
Processes
Implementation; Integration; Verification; Transition;
Validation; Operation; Disposal
Technical
Project Planning; Project Assessment and Control;
Management
Decision Management; Risk Management;
Processes
Configuration Management; Information Management
Organization
Life Cycle Model Management; Infrastructure
Project-Enabling
Management; Portfolio Management; Quality
Processes
Management; Knowledge Management
Agreement
Acquisition
Processes

FIG. 6: OVERVIEW OF COMPLIANCE DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE
TECHNICAL PROCESSES.

FIG. 7: OVERVIEW OF COMPLIANCE DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE
TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT PROCESSES.

FIG. 8: OVERVIEW OF COMPLIANCE DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE
ORGANIZATION PROJECT-ENABLING PROCESSES.
TABLE 5: CONSOLIDATED LIST OF NIST SP 800-53R4 SUGGESTED PROCESSES.
First Level Processes (by domain
Related Processes (by explicit
association)
relationship)
Business or Mission Analysis
Stakeholder Needs and Requirements
System Requirements Definition
Definition
Architecture Definition
System Analysis
Design Definition
Maintenance
Implementation
Supply
Integration
Quality Assurance
Verification
Human Resource Management
Transition
Measurement
Validation
Operation
Disposal
Project Planning
Project Assessment and Control
Decision Management
Risk Management
Configuration Management
Information Management
Life Cycle Model Management
Infrastructure Management
Portfolio Management
Quality Management
Knowledge Management
Acquisition

In this example, 23 of the 30 processes are identified by the
Compliance domain. Adding in the related processes, all 30
are identified. This, however, does not mean that Compliance
should be considered the most important of all domains.
Conversely, it identifies that this specific domain reaches
across all processes and activities in some manner and should
be further scrutinized and evaluated for its specific system. It
also points to an area in the methodology that requires
additional research and considerations in order to provide the
user more actionable items and results.

B. Defense Acquisition Guidebook
The next example examines Chapter 13 of the Defense
Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) [25], which provides detailed
procedural steps in performing criticality analysis, the
Department of Defense’s (DoD) method by which missioncritical components and information are identified and
prioritized. In essence, this program protection concept seeks
to defend warfighting capabilities by keeping secret things
from getting out and malicious things from getting in [25],
[22]. The DAG provides details on integrating classical
Systems Engineering processes for mitigating and managing
risks to unprecedented technologies and mission-critical
system functionality throughout the acquisition lifecycle [25].
Using the DAG prioritization scheme from [2], the domains
list by “order of importance” are: System Resiliency and Asset
Management; Compliance and Interconnectivity; and finally
People, Operations, and Physical and Environmental.
Applying the domain-to-process methodology to the System
Resiliency and Asset Management domains, we can determine
the associated processes from each of the families,
summarized in Table 6. Figs. 9, 10, and 11 display modified
versions of Figs. 2, 3, and 4, highlighting only the domains of
interest (System Resiliency and Asset Management). Note that
System Resiliency and Asset Management were prioritized
equally in the aforementioned scheme.
Exploring the processes in the relationship graph and
accounting for duplicates, the list of related processes reduces
down to (in no particular order): Decision Management,
Configuration Management, Stakeholder Needs and
Requirements Definition; System Requirements Definition,
System Analysis, Operation, Disposal, Supply, Project
Assessment and Control, Quality Assurance, Quality
Management, and Business or Mission Analysis. Table 7
shows the finalized list of first level processes obtained by
using the domain-to-process mapping methodology as well as
the second level related processes from the associated
relationship graph.
In this example, we identified that 25 of the 30 processes
should have some consideration based on the prioritization of
System Resiliency and Asset Management. Perhaps more
realistically, an initial approach could focus directly on the 13
first level processes (and perhaps even prioritize those
processes themselves to determine which has more importance
in the context of the system) and only attempt to address the
related processes as needed or as time and resources allow.
For instance, we can construct a new “hybrid” graph that
provides additional information by aggregating the domains’
values (or the values of their process “hit rates”). Figs. 12, 13,
and 14 show that by focusing on the processes in this manner,
we can narrow the list to: Validation, Verification, Risk
Management, and Infrastructure Management. This is not to
say that these processes are of more importance; rather, these
processes have a higher correlation value given our particular
association scheme and may prove to be a reasonable starting
point for considering the large number of identified processes.

Process Families
Technical
Processes
Technical
Management
Processes
Organization
Project-Enabling
Processes
Agreement
Processes

TABLE 6: DAG FIRST LEVEL PROCESSES.
System
Asset Management
Resiliency
Architecture Definition; Design
Verification;
Definition; Implementation;
Validation
Integration; Verification; Transition;
Validation; Maintenance
Risk
Management

Information Management

Life Cycle
Model
Management

Infrastructure Management

N/A

Acquisition

FIG. 10: OVERVIEW OF SYSTEM RESILIENCY AND ASSET MANAGEMENT
DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT PROCESSES.

FIG. 9: OVERVIEW OF SYSTEM RESILIENCY AND ASSET MANAGEMENT
DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE TECHNICAL PROCESSES.

FIG. 11: OVERVIEW OF SYSTEM RESILIENCY AND ASSET MANAGEMENT
DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE ORG. PROJECT-ENABLING PROCESSES.

TABLE 7: CONSOLIDATED LIST OF DAG SUGGESTED PROCESSES.
First Level Processes (by domain
Related Processes (by explicit
association)
relationship)
Architecture Definition
Decision Management
Design Definition
Configuration Management
Implementation
Stakeholder Needs and Requirements
Integration
Definition System Requirements
Verification
Definition
Transition
System Analysis
Validation
Operation
Maintenance
Disposal
Risk Management
Supply
Information Management
Project Assessment and Control
Life Cycle Model Management
Quality Assurance
Infrastructure Management
Quality Management
Acquisition
Business or Mission Analysis

FIG. 13: AGGREGATED OVERVIEW OF DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE
TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT PROCESSES.

FIG. 12: AGGREGATED OVERVIEW OF DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE
TECHNICAL PROCESSES.

FIG. 14: AGGREGATED OVERVIEW OF DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE
ORGANIZATION PROJECT-ENABLING PROCESSES.

C. SCADA Security Policy Framework
The final prioritization example uses the Framework for
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Security
Policy, developed by Sandia National Laboratories in an effort
to ease the creation of SCADA security policies and ensuring
coverage over all critical areas of SCADA security as well as
flexibility in developing customized policies for specific
operations [26]. The domains list by “order of importance” for
this example are: Asset Management; People, Operations,
Physical and Environmental; and finally Compliance, System
Resiliency, and Interconnectivity [2]. Applying the same
methodology as before to the Asset Management domain
gives us Table 8 and Figs. 15, 16, and 17. Similarly, Table 9
summarizes the second level related processes.
In this example, 11 of the 30 processes are identified,
providing the Systems Engineer a reasonable starting point in
tailoring the NIST SP 800-160 toward developing a verifiably
secure SCADA system. Like before, the 14 related processes
provide supplementary direction for secure development,
given additional time and resources.
TABLE 8: SCADA FRAMEWORK FIRST LEVEL PROCESSES.
Process Families
Asset Management
Architecture Definition; Design Definition;
Technical Processes
Implementation; Integration; Verification;
Transition; Validation; Maintenance
Technical
Management
Information Management
Processes
Organization ProjectInfrastructure Management
Enabling Processes
Agreement Processes
Acquisition

FIG. 16: OVERVIEW OF ASSET MANAGEMENT DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH
SSE TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT PROCESSES.

FIG. 17: OVERVIEW OF ASSET MANAGEMENT DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH
SSE ORGANIZATION PROJECT-ENABLING PROCESSES.

FIG. 15: OVERVIEW OF ASSET MANAGEMENT DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH
SSE TECHNICAL PROCESSES.

TABLE 9: CONSOLIDATED LIST OF SCADA FRAMEWORK SUGGESTED
PROCESSES.
First Level Processes (by domain
Related Processes (by explicit
association)
relationship)
Architecture Definition
Decision Management
Design Definition
Risk Management
Implementation
Configuration Management
Integration
Stakeholder Needs and Requirements
Verification
Definition
Transition
System Requirements Definition
Validation
System Analysis
Maintenance
Operation
Information Management
Disposal
Infrastructure Management
Supply
Acquisition
Project Assessment and Control
Quality Assurance
Quality Management
Business or Mission Analysis

D. Observations
These three examples demonstrate that the “most
important” processes when tailoring the NIST SP 800-160 for
the three system frameworks are vastly different from one
another given the specific prioritization mappings (which
presumably represent the stakeholders’ priorities).
We also noted that in the first example, the NIST SP 80053R4, that Compliance was the dominant domain of interest
given the prioritization scheme presented in [2]. With it, all 30
processes were highlighted as being associated with the
domain through first level and second level relationships.
While this result may not provide initial actionable
information for the Systems Engineer, it does offer
substantiation that Compliance plays a role in all SSE
activities and must be considered under most, if not all,
circumstances. Motivation to comply is often based on the
users’ understanding of why their actions and behaviors can
put organizational assets at risk [28].
The second example using the DAG emphasized the fact
that prioritizing multiple domains may initially highlight too
many processes of interest for the Systems Engineer. By
aggregating their associative sums, however, we were able to
identify which processes appeared more consistently across
the various domains and able to offer the Systems Engineer a
more targeted approach at tailorability, identifying four of the
30 processes. The final example, the Sandia National Labs
SCADA Framework, initially highlighted 11 of the 30
processes for consideration. By focusing on these 11, the
Systems Engineer can prioritize their SSE efforts to develop a
verifiably secure system with an emphasis on Asset
Management security.
VI. CONCLUSION
As current security practices often lack effective
methodologies to determine, prioritize, and address system
security issues in complex systems, this paper proposes an
innovative approach towards the efficient application of SSE
processes, activities, and tasks. It does so by offering a
mapping to the processes and activities listed in the NIST SP
800-160 as well as providing direct relationships between the
processes and activities to allow for further development
opportunities for the Systems Engineer. Finally, this work

demonstrates the utility of the domain-to-process mappings
with three example scenarios.
While the tools and expertise that enable systems engineers
to obtain information about the events such as attack paths,
likelihood of successful compromise, and the nature and
severity of the event exists, information about the potential
risk to a system is not readily available using any tools or
software [29]. Some prioritization can be performed, but uses
the human decision-maker’s internal knowledge that is
different for each decision-maker; this requires proficient
domain knowledge and substantial time [29]. Our proposed
framework attempts to create a bridge between the experts and
those looking to eventually delve into SSE practices by
offering an initial tool for prioritization that complements
much of the decision-maker’s required knowledge and time
through this initial research.
In future work, we desire to further analyze the domain-toprocess mapping and relationship in order to better depict a
more accurate (and more correct) correlation between the
system agnostic domains and the NIST SP 800-160.
Additionally, we hope to apply this methodology and
framework to a working system, such as a vehicle or avionics
system, in order to test its validity and adjust our framework
based on these real-world findings. Finally, we would like to
be able to provide additional insight into duplicate process
listings, as this current effort (save for the second example)
treats all processes equally for the purposes of this research
activity. Doing so may provide a more detailed approach at
domain criticality or process importance for the Systems
Engineer and brings us closer to fully understanding an
effective systems security approach, increase the
manageability of SSE efforts, and provide cost effective SSE
solutions.
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6. Discussion
6.1. Conclusions of Research
In examining SSE concepts and developing a framework for understanding,
prioritizing, and applying SSE processes, activities, and tasks, the intended purpose of
this research effort endeavored to address three research questions:
1. How can SSE be understood and described with respect to established
Systems Engineering processes?
2. How can SSE efforts be decomposed into universally applicable systems
security domains?
3. How can SSE processes, activities, and tasks be prioritized and applied to
diverse classes of systems?
In order to answer the first question, a comprehensive overview of prevailing SSE
concepts and practices is required. To determine the current status of SSE, it is imperative
to appreciate the historical context under which SSE was developed and to understand its
evolution over the years in order to satisfy various requirements. The articles “A
Foundation for Developing Sustainably Secure Systems” and “Putting the ‘Systems’ in
Security Engineering” discusses the history of notable systems-oriented security
publications and its culmination in the NIST SP 800-160 [1], [2].
With the historical context discussed, these two articles proceed to elaborate on
developing a multidisciplinary engineering approach which ensures security requirements
and needs are addressed with appropriate fidelity and rigor by aligning with the 30
Systems Engineering life cycle processes of ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 (discussed in the NIST
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SP 800-160) to address system security considerations throughout the entire system life
cycle [3].
The second research question is answered in the article “System-Agnostic
Security Domains for Understanding and Prioritizing Systems Security Engineering
Efforts,” where seven abstracted systems security domains are proposed to broadly
describe a “universal” approach for understanding and categorizing systems security
concerns into distinct domains. The article also demonstrates the utility of the proposed
system agnostic domains with three example prioritization schemes based on the
importance (or criticality) of each security domain, allowing an organization to determine
which domains are more important and therefore warrant more resources. For example,
three well-established security frameworks (Cyber, ICS, and DoD) were examined and
used to create mappings from their particular characteristics and system properties back
to the system agnostic security domains. This research effort resulted in the construction
of prioritization schemes that determine how to organize the security domains in level of
importance for the system developer based on what controls are assumed to matter more
for the system or organization [4]. In doing so, the researchers’ work provides essential
knowledge for understanding how to more effectively apply SSE processes for
engineering trustworthy and secure systems.
In response to the third research question, the researcher looked into how SSE
processes, activities, and tasks can be systematically applied to diverse classes of
systems. In the article “A Framework for Prioritizing Systems Security Engineering
Processes, Activities, and Tasks,” several existing frameworks were explored and
introduced discussions for effectively applying the SSE processes, activities, and tasks
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described in the NIST SP 800-160 were introduced. The first involved a graphical
analysis on the tightly coupled nature of the SSE processes as presented in the NIST SP
800-160, while the second provided an initial provision for mapping the SSE processes
and activities to the system agnostic security domains introduced in [4]. As a result, this
work uniquely offers a systematic application of SSE processes, activities, and tasks to
diverse classes of systems, culminating in a repeatable and tailorable methodology which
allows system developers to focus on high return on investment SSE processes, activities,
and tasks to more efficiently meet stakeholder protection needs.
6.2. Significance of Research
With the development of increasingly complex systems, Systems Engineers need
to be concerned with addressing stakeholder security needs and objectives in a systematic
way to deliver trustworthy secure systems. This research offers the community a look
into recent developments in the field of SSE in order to provide an approach which
ensures networked systems operate properly despite uncertain environments, malicious
and non-malicious disruptions, and intelligent adversaries. While the NIST SP 800-160
delivers a first-of-its-kind, systems-oriented approach to ensuring stakeholder security
requirements and protection needs are met with appropriate fidelity and rigor [2], this
research provides a directed methodology for efficiently applying the NIST SP 800-160.
Additionally, in recommending the seven systems agnostic security domains, this
research provides an approach for universally understanding and categorizing systems
security concerns [4]. These abstracted domains serve as a common baseline for
implementing SSE while thoroughly understanding and discussing the system security
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problem in addition to building confidence in inter-organizational activities such as
developing security standards and effective security practices [4].
While the tools and expertise that enable Systems Engineers to obtain information
about security events such as attack paths, likelihood of successful compromise, and the
nature and severity of the event exists, information about the potential risk to a system is
not readily available using any tools or software [6]. Thus deductions are drawn,
primarily from the human decision-maker’s internal knowledge, which is different for
each decision-maker, requires expert domain knowledge, substantial time, and is error
prone [6]. The proposed framework attempts to create a bridge between experts and those
looking to apply state of the art SSE practices by offering a prioritization tool to reduce
some of the decision-makers’ required knowledge and time.
Furthermore, of the three key decision making processes for acquiring DoD
weapon systems (requirements determination, resource allocation, and the acquisition
management system), this framework focuses most directly on resource allocation by
offering a systematic application of SSE processes, activities, and tasks to allow system
developers more efficiently meet stakeholder protection needs and providing a prioritized
approach to securing major weapon systems, some of which cost hundreds of millions or
billions of dollars to design, develop, and field [7].
6.3. Recommendations for Future Research
The initial designs for this research were heavily constrained by available time
and resources for what is primarily a proof of concept. In laying the foundation for this
system agnostic framework, however, an opportunity is created for further analysis and
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research in this topic. One such consideration for additional investigation, for example,
would be applying this methodology and framework to a working system, such as a
vehicle or avionics system, in order to test its validity and update the framework based on
these real-world findings. With initiatives such as the U.S. Air Force’s Task Force Cyber
Secure (designed to synchronize multiple efforts and studies attempting to address
cybersecurity and focus operations to increasing robustness and resilience of critical Air
Force systems for core missions in and through cyberspace), using this framework in a
government program office or commercial sector may provide a more detailed
understanding of domain criticality or process importance for the Systems Engineer and
potentially brings us closer to fully developing an effective systems security approach to
increase the manageability of SSE efforts and provide cost effective SSE solutions [7],
[8].
Another consideration would be the reevaluation of the current list of seven
system agnostic domains. The present list is only merely interpretation of the most
important aspects of current systems and existing security frameworks. Further
elaboration or additional domains could, and should, be considered when using this
original concept for continuing research to create a more accurate (and more correct)
correlation between the system agnostic domains and the NIST SP 800-160, especially if
viable applications and results could be gained from the aforementioned real-work
applications. Likewise, future research could reevaluate the current domain-to-process
mapping. The provided mapping is only one possible constructive effort and may not
necessarily be the most correct mapping. Further analysis or different interpretations
would likely produce results that provide value to the system developer. In addition, the
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current mapping is constructed by associating domains to processes via their activities.
Another possible construction would be to examine the tasks associated with the
activities and conduct that particular mapping. This would provide an opportunity to
study whether or not the change in mapping would produce any noticeable results in the
final framework.
Finally, while this research offers Systems Engineers the ability to efficiently
prioritize and apply vetted SSE processes and activities in order to maximize return on
investment and minimize the costs associated with it, the current research lacks a suitable
metric for measuring the efficiency being claimed by the thesis. Developing or adopting
an appropriate metric for analysis would provide increased validity to the framework.
Possible metrics that should be examined include level of security and/or costs as a result
of implementing the framework.
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Prologue
Lastly, some insights and lessons learned throughout the research process to other
students. Systems Engineering, and to a further extent, Systems Security Engineering, are
very broad areas of study with no hard guidelines or check lists to ensure that complete
understanding and applicability is guaranteed. As a student of the Computer Science and
Computer Engineering Department with a Bachelor’s in Computer Telecommunications
Engineering, a Master’s in System Engineering, and an AFIT curriculum in Cyber
Operations, I found myself with a unique opportunity to tackling this research area. With
a detailed understanding of the technical aspects of IT, and cyber, and security systems,
coupled alongside a comprehensive familiarity of systems procurement and development,
identifying a need for and following through with this area of research was still quite
difficult at times.
For those lacking a similar background, however, don’t fret. In fact, your varied
experiences and points of views could bring novel insight and provide new understanding
to SSE research that I could never have thought possible. While a good SE understanding
provides much of the underlying foundation needed to follow-on this work, having a
good understanding at the way “traditional” engineers think and process information
(such as in Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering,
Security Engineering) also has its benefits. To this, I recommend at least browsing
through Ross Anderson’s book, Security Engineering, as it provides not only a high level
overview of security applications to a variety of important systems, but also an in-depth
understanding on critical topics such as technical engineering basics, specialized
protection mechanisms, security psychology, policy, and much more. Additionally, the
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Defense Acquisition Guidebook, particularly Chapter 13 on Program Protection, provides
valuable SE and technical insight into how the DoD focuses on systems and systems
security.
Secondly, regarding concept of, this research was very conceptual (especially at
the onset), providing very little confirmation of correctness or success level. It was not
until the final article that there was an actual new product being developed (the
framework) that provided any real sense of completion or accomplishment. From this
experience, I recommend not letting the absence of tangible results in the early- and midresearch timeframes discourage you, but help set a path for discussion between you and
your research advisor or committee in determining what success ultimately means to you.
Finally, while coursework largely depends on the student’s curriculum and degree
program and usually encompasses the first half of your time at AFIT, starting work on
your thesis during this first half, no matter how trivial (such as gathering, reading, and
documenting background works related to your thesis), allows you to more evenly
allocate the workload throughout the entire program, rather than forcing you to sharply
increase the effort in order to meet mandatory deadlines. Building a large buffer towards
to the end of your time at AFIT by focusing on work earlier rather than later allows you
to avoid much of the stress and pressure many students end up dealing with by focusing
only on coursework during the beginning. That isn’t to say, however, that you shouldn’t
focus on your coursework and grades; it’s just as important as finishing up your thesis!
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